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ABSTRACT 
By most accounts, the December 2012 Doha Round negotiations 
achieved little. The continued failure of member governments to reach 
consensus increases the risk of a catastrophic rise in global emissions. 
The current impasse is due in no small measure to the expressed concern 
of the United States that a climate change treaty will end up transferring 
enormous wealth from the United States to China. 
Analyzing the relevant market data, this Article concludes that there 
is little or no evidence to support the notion that ratification of the Kyoto 
Protocol will lead to the massive wealth transfers feared by the United 
States. Indeed, the market study demonstrates the opposite. By 
deconstructing the “China myth,” this Article achieves two tasks. First, 
it rebuts the principal argument that U.S. policy-makers and the Senate 
have offered to justify the United States’ refusal to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol. Second, in taking China out of the equation, it enables U.S. 
climate justice theory to resume the arrested conversation about the 
obligations of the United States, and other developed nations, to address 
the problem of global emissions. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
The Doha round of climate negotiations in December 2012 produced 
little results, in no small measure because of the United States’ concerns.1 
Despite the risk of incalculable harms and consequences to life and 
livelihood posed by the rise of greenhouse gas emissions, the United States 
is reluctant to sign an emissions accord.2  This is because the United States 
contends that emissions trading will entail an enormous and unfair wealth 
transfer from the United States to China, thus making what Professor Dan 
 
 1.  See, e.g., Roger Harrabin, UN Climate Talks Extend Kyoto Protocol, Promise Compensation, 
BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2012, 2:20 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20653018; 
Michael Jacobs, The Doha Climate Talks Were A Start, But 2015 Will Be The Moment of truth, 
GUARDIAN, Dec. 10, 2012, at 19, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/dec/10/ 
doha-climate-talks-global-warming; Barbara Lewis & Alister Doyle, Despair After Climate Conference, 
But UN Still Offers Hope, REUTERS (Dec. 9, 2012, 11:14 AM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/12/09/climate-talks-process-idUSL5E8N7BQV20121209. 
 2.  U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME, THE EMISSIONS GAP REPORT 2012 16 (2012), available 
at http://www.unep.org/pdf/2012gapreport.pdf. 
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Farber calls the “China argument.”3  
In the scholarly literature, the case for and against the United States 
ratifying the Kyoto Protocol4 is framed as a choice between justice theory 
and moral theory. Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein are examples of justice 
theorists in this area,5 contending that the United States is not obligated to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol under prevailing theories of justice because “[t]he 
Kyoto Protocol imposed no obligations on China, now the biggest emitter 
and placed heavy burdens on the United States.”6 
Professor Dan Farber responds to Posner and Sunstein’s argument 
from justice theory7 with an argument from moral theory.8 Farber forcibly 
argues that the United States has a moral obligation to ratify the Kyoto 
Protocol, because of its wealth and history of significant past and 
 
 3.  Daniel A. Farber, Climate Justice and the China Fallacy, 15 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENVTL. L. 
& POL’Y 15, 16 (2009).  For a classic exposition on justice theory and the China fear that dominates 
American academic and political response on global greenhouse gas emissions, see generally Eric A. 
Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Climate Change Justice, 96 GEO. L.J. 1565 (2008). Similarly, Jonathan 
Wiener directly related U.S. climate policy to China.  See, e.g., Jonathan Wiener, Climate Change 
Policy and Policy Change in China, 55 UCLA  L. REV. 1805, 1806 (2008) (“To solve the climate 
change problem, the United States must act, and it must engage China.”). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Of 
Montreal and Kyoto: A Tale of Two Protocols, 31 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto]; Cass R. Sunstein, The World vs. the United States and China? The 
Complex Climate Change Incentives of the Leading Greenhouse Gas Emitters, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1675, 
1676 (2008) [hereinafter Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives]; Cass R. Sunstein, Climate 
Change: Lessons from Reagan, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 11, 2012, at SR4, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/11/opinion/sunday/climate-change-lessons-from-ronald-reagan.html 
(“As in the case of the Montreal Protocol, an effective response to climate change requires many 
nations to act. China is the biggest greenhouse gas emitter on the planet, and it must become a leader in 
international negotiations . . . .”); Cass Sunstein, U.S. Should Act Unilaterally on Climate Change, 
BLOOMBERG (Jan. 23, 2013, 6:55PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-01-23/u-s-should-act-
unilaterally-on-climate-change.html (stating that those opposing U.S. participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol emphasize “developing nations (above all China)” do not have binding commitments). 
 4.   See Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec 
10, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol], available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/ 
convkp/kpeng.pdf. 
 5.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1572.  See also Farber, supra note 3, at 15; Daniel A. 
Farber, The Case for Climate Compensation: Justice for Climate Change Victims in a Complex World, 
2008 UTAH L. REV. 377, 378 (2008); Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Essay, Climate Change and 
U.S. Interests, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1532, 1534 (2009); Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 3, 
at 7; Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives, supra note 3, at 1677. For similar arguments in the 
press see Elizabeth Rosenthal & Andrew W. Lehren, Profits on Carbon Credits Drive Output of a 
Harmful Gas, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2012, at A1. 
 6.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1600 (emphasis added). Even so, they believe America 
should participate in the Kyoto Protocol, albeit for very different reasons.  Id. at 1572. 
 7.  See generally Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3. 
 8.  Farber challenges Posner & Sunstein’s empirical and normative claims on corrective and 
distributive justice. See generally Farber, supra note 5; Farber, supra note 3. For a brief summary of the 
Posner & Sunstein vs. Farber debate, see Freeman & Guzman, supra note 5, at 1534, 1537. 
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continuing high level of greenhouse gas contributions.9 This deontic 
response, of course, fails to answer the essentially instrumentalist argument 
that U.S. legal scholars and the U.S. government make regarding the Kyoto 
Protocol.10 
Both justice and moral theorists proceed on the presumption that if the 
United States signs the Protocol, the economic consequences will be to 
transfer wealth from the United States to China.11 To date, however, legal 
scholars have not examined actual data to determine whether this 
underlying assumption is rooted in fact.  This Article is the first to examine 
whether the evidence supports the presumption - will vast sums of U.S. 
money drain into China, if the United States ratifies the Kyoto Protocol. 
This Article introduces evidence that casts serious doubts on this 
assumption. 
The United States opposes the Kyoto Protocol because under the 
existing regime, the United States and China occupy very different 
positions and have dissimilar rights and obligations. On the one hand, if the 
United States ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, as an industrialized nation, the 
United States will become subject to legally binding emission reduction 
targets, which the United States fears that it will be unable to meet. China 
on the other hand, as a developing country, is encouraged, but not legally 
required, to limit its greenhouse gas emissions.12 The Kyoto Protocol 
allows countries to register and earn “carbon credits” for activities that 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions.13 Nations can “sell” their surplus credits 
to countries that have failed to meet their targets. China has no specific 
target, and has earned the maximum number of credits to date.14 Therefore, 
the United States fears that it will not be able to meet its target specified in 
the Kyoto Protocol, and so, if it ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, it will be 
compelled to purchase carbon credits from China, the largest supplier; 
 
 9.  Farber, supra note 5, at 379–80; Farber, supra note 3, at 15. 
 10.  See Wiener, supra note 3, at 1812–16 (arguing (a) in the context of global warming, nations 
place limited value on moral arguments, and (b) appealing to the country’s gains at the national and 
global levels would be a better strategy). 
 11.  See Jacobs, supra note 1; Lewis & Doyle, supra note 1. 
 12. List of Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, http://unfccc.int/parties_and_observers/parties/non_annex_i/items/2833.php (last visited Dec. 
23, 2013). See also CDM Rulebook: Non Annex I, BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://cdmrulebook.org/973 
(last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 13.  This Article uses carbon market to refer to the market established by the Kyoto Protocol’s 
Clean Development Mechanism rules. These credits are commonly known as “certified emission 
reductions.” See infra Part II for detailed discussion on different types of markets and credits that can 
be traded thereunder. 
 14.  Historically, China has accounted for over fifty percent of the total carbon credit supply. For 
details see infra Part II. 
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resulting in enormous wealth transfer from the United States to China. As 
Eric Posner and Cass Sunstein comment, “[I]ndeed, the cost to the United 
States might have been as high as 80% of the total [expense of the Kyoto 
Protocol].”15 
This Article introduces empirical evidence that raises serious 
questions on whether the Protocol will result in transferring U.S. wealth to 
China, as previously assumed. The data suggests the “China argument” 
may be a myth (the “China myth”). In Part I, this Article will provide a 
brief background on the existing literature. Specifically, scholars have been 
grappling with the question of U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol, 
against the backdrop of the Protocol’s different treatment of the United 
States and China. Neither justice theorists nor moral theorists have been 
able to provide a cogent theory justifying U.S. participation in the Kyoto 
Protocol, if China will receive vast sums of U.S. money, in the event the 
United States participates in the Kyoto Protocol. In Part II, this Article will 
describe the Kyoto Protocol, particularly, the market created thereunder 
that has been a key source of the United States’ ire and objection to the 
Protocol. This study will review the contracts and transactions 
consummated in the existing carbon market (namely, the Clean 
Development Mechanism established by the United Nations Framework 
Convention on Climate Change and Kyoto Protocol) to determine who 
owns the carbon credits, and whether the United States will be required to 
turn over vast sums to China under the present market regime.16 This 
Article is the first effort to mine the Kyoto Protocol’s carbon marketplace 
for evidence of the economic effect of carbon credit sales,17 and to that 
 
 15.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1611. 
 16.  See Clean Development Mechanism, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE, 
http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/mechanisms/clean_development_mechanism/items/2718.php (last 
visited Dec. 23, 2013).  See also United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 
1992, U.N. Doc. FCCC/Informal/84 [hereinafter UNFCCC]. The UNFCCC has a long history and was 
negotiated at the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, held in Rio de Janeiro 
between June 3–14, 1992. 
 17.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE STERN REVIEW: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 
(2006); WILLIAM NORDHAUS & JOSEPH BOYER, WARMING THE WORLD (2000); Robert Mendelsohn, 
Ariel Dinar & Larry Williams, The Distributional Impact of Climate Change on Rich and Poor 
Countries, 11 ENV’T & DEV’T ECON. 159 (2006). A sub-set of economists generally believes that the 
United States will profit from global warming. See, e.g., Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives, 
supra note 3. Freeman & Guzman strike a slightly different economic approach, stressing that the 
current approaches underestimate the impact of climate change on the U.S. and the spill-over effects 
from abroad, and arguing that overall the U.S. would not be a net-gainer.  Freeman & Guzman, supra 
note 5, at 1539–40. But Freeman & Guzman’s theorem requires the law to first accept and adopt a more 
commodious notion of cost-benefit for climate change than usually accepted.  The few Articles on 
carbon credits have focused solely on country of origin, and not proceeded to examine the market. See, 
e.g., Tyler McNish, Carbon Offsets are a Bridge Too Far in the Tradable Property Rights Revolution, 
36 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 387 (2012); James Salzman & J.B. Ruhl, Currencies and the 
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extent it joins the literature on environmental markets generally.18 
Part III will analyze the empirical data and demonstrate that the 
United States will lose little money to China through emissions trading. 
The raw data essentially depict the lion’s share of China’s carbon credits 
are presold to traders in advanced countries. Over 90 percent of Chinese 
industrial initiatives that earned carbon credits have sold the credits to 
principals in advanced countries.19 As a result, the United States does not 
have to fear that if it enters the market as a buyer (because it is unable to 
meet its emissions targets required by the Kyoto Protocol), it will be 
compelled to purchase credits from China, transferring huge sums of 
money to China.20 China has sold a vast majority of its stake to 
corporations, a majority of which are based in Europe or Japan. These 
corporations have executed forward purchase contracts and have bought 
over ninety percent of China’s entire portfolio.21 China may own very few 
credits (less than the 8 percent) that it originally received.22 As a result, 
little to no future revenues arising from U.S. entry into the market will be 
sent to Beijing.23 Similarly, if the market collapses as a result of U.S. 
 
Commodification of Environmental Law, 53 STAN. L. REV. 607, 628–29 (2000); Michael Wara, 
Measuring the Clean Development Mechanism’s Performance and Potential, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1759 
(2008); Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5. 
 18.  There is extensive literature on environmental markets. See generally Bruce A. Ackerman & 
Richard B. Stewart, Comment, Reforming Environmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333 (1985); Daniel J. 
Dudek & John Palmisano, Emissions Trading: Why is This Thoroughbred Hobbled?, 13 COLUM. J. 
ENVTL. L. 217 (1988); Robert W. Hahn & Robert N. Stavins, Incentive-Based Environmental 
Regulation: A New Era from an Old Idea?, 18 ECOLOGY L.Q. 1 (1991); Howard Latin, Ideal Versus 
Real Regulatory Efficiency: Implementation of Uniform Standards and “Fine-Tuning” Regulatory 
Reforms, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1267 (1985); Thomas W. Merrill, Explaining Market Mechanisms, 2000 U. 
ILL. L. REV. 275 (2000); Jonathan Baert Wiener, Global Environmental Regulation: Instrument Choice 
in Legal Context, 108 YALE L.J. 677 (1999). 
 19.  See infra Figure 6. 
 20.  For estimates on the cost of signing the Kyoto Protocol see, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, It's Only 
$300 Billion, WASH. POST, May 10, 2006, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/05/09/AR2006050901502.html.  For other estimates see NICHOLAS LINACRE 
ET AL., WORLD BANK, STATE AND TRENDS OF THE CARBON MARKET 2011 9 (2011), available at 
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTCARBONFINANCE/Resources/StateAndTrend_LowRes.pdf 
(estimating the United Nations’ carbon market at  approximately $20 billion per year in primary and 
secondary market transactions during 2009 and 2010); A. DENNY ELLERMAN, HENRY D. JACOBY & 
ANNELÈNE DECAUX, WORLD BANK, THE EFFECTS ON DEVELOPING COUNTRIES OF THE KYOTO 
PROTOCOL AND CO2 EMISSIONS TRADING 21–22 (1998), available at 
http://elibrary.worldbank.org/doi/pdf/10.1596/1813-9450-2019 (assessing the cost at $38 billion, and 
$35 billion (with trading)). 
 21.  See infra Part III.B. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  The outflow from the United States to Europe and Japan will be even lower because this 
Article only analyzes data from “first sales” or the initial sale of credits from China, which is publicly 
available. Subsequent sales are not included. 
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refusal, China will remain unaffected (since it has already alienated its 
credits) and any future market losses will be borne by buyers in other 
countries. Thus, this Part will show the facts do not support the China 
argument that prevents the United States from participating in the Kyoto 
Protocol. After laying out the facts that debunk the China myth, Part IV 
will remark on the theoretical implications of the empirical results, and 
provide select observations on the future development of a normative 
theory of climate justice. The concluding remarks will spotlight the 
importance of factual and data analysis to legal scholarship.   
Critics could argue, as they often do with empirical research that the 
study engages in static projection and fails to consider the longer term 
reaction of the system to the change.24 In this case, critics could contend - 
What if China files for and earns new credits rapidly, as soon as the United 
States ratifies the Protocol? Then, significant U.S. wealth will still flow 
into China, undercutting the analysis here. This possibility may be set to 
rest on the basis of facts. If the United States ratifies the Protocol, and is 
looking for credits, it could easily buy on the secondary market (the huge 
trove of China’s credits are now owned foreign or non-Chinese entities).25 
According to the UNFCCC, it has issued over a billion credits from 2001 to 
2012, exceeding U.S. targets indicated in the Kyoto Protocol.26 Moreover, 
Chinese corporations must fulfill many international rules, receive 
approvals from U.N. bodies and external, non-Chinese organizations before 
receiving a credit and as a practical matter, they cannot earn credits and 
flood the market so quickly.27  By showing that there is a significant group 
of buyers, and stock of credits available outside of China to meet any 
potential U.S. need in future years, this study provides policy-makers with 
information relevant to the future; overcoming any potential objection that 
the analysis is “static,” or the data and conclusion have no relevance for the 
future. This, and other objections shall be addressed in detail in Part 
III.B.4.’s Response to Possible Objections. 
A general objection may be that this international treaty was not 
created to benefit traders or strategic investors such as the World Bank and 
 
 24.  Static projection or analysis or scoring means simplified analysis where the effect of an 
immediate change to a system is calculated without respect to the longer-term response of the system to 
that change. I am grateful to Professor Tom Merrill for raising this possibility. 
 25.  See infra Part III.B. 
 26.  See News Release: Kyoto Protocol's CDM Passes One Billionth Certified Emission Reduction 
Milestone, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Sept. 7, 2012), 
https://cdm.unfccc.int/CDMNews/issues/issues/I_P0QZOY6FWYYKFKOSAZ5GYH2250DRQK/view
newsitem.html. 
 27.  For the procedures required before credits are awarded, see infra Part II.C. 
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Goldman Sachs.28 This Article focuses on the question of whether the facts 
corroborate the China argument, and so, the generic debate on the purpose 
of the Protocol is beyond the scope of this Article.  
In addition to contributing to the theoretical literature, this Article 
assists American climate policy. This study does not intend to be a 
comprehensive answer to the objection that China may gain a competitive 
advantage over U.S. manufacturing industry. By exposing the China 
argument as a myth, this survey eliminates the abiding thorn preventing 
multiple administrations from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.  Even though 
studies show market based solutions are a most efficient solution for 
pollution hazards and would potentially save billions of dollars annually,29 
the Senate opposes and blocks U.S. participation in the international 
emissions treaty.30 Citing China, by unanimous vote, the Senate refused to 
ratify the Kyoto Protocol in 1998.31 Such a vote was ironic, given then Vice 
President Al Gore’s heavy involvement in designing the Protocol.32 
 
 28.  See Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5 (observing the credits bought by Honeywell and 
Goldman Sachs). This position is particularly noteworthy, because Rosenthal and Lehren are otherwise 
critical of carbon credits. See also About the World Bank Carbon Finance Unit (CFU), WORLD BANK, 
https://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm?Page=About& (last visited Dec. 23, 2013) (“Unlike other 
World Bank development products, the CFU does not lend or grant resources to projects, but rather 
contracts to purchase emission reductions similar to a commercial transaction, paying for them annually 
or periodically once they have been verified by a third party auditor.”).  For the World Bank Carbon 
Finance Unit’s portfolio, see Project Portfolio, WORLD BANK, http://wbcarbonfinance.org/Router.cfm? 
Page=ProjPort&ItemID=24702 (last visited Dec. 23, 2013). 
 29.  For a general discussion on market based pollution trading programs and the billions of 
dollars they would save annually, see Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 18, at 1339; Bruce A. Ackerman 
& Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Environmental Law: The Democratic Case for Market Incentives, 13 
COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 171, 171 (1988); Richard B. Stewart, Controlling Environmental Risks Through 
Economic Incentives, 13 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 153, 156 (1988). For a discussion on the advantages of 
the carbon trading platform specifically, see RICHARD B. STEWART & JONATHAN B. WIENER, 
RECONSTRUCTING CLIMATE POLICY: BEYOND KYOTO 11–16 (2003). 
 30.  See, e.g., Senator Hagel’s comments on the Senate floor during the debate on ratifying the 
Kyoto Protocol: “We are also interested in why the administration is advocating legally binding 
emissions reductions for the United States and not for nearly 130 other countries, like China . . . . We 
look forward to hearing from Under Secretary Wirth on this issue and the apparent inequalities inherent 
in any such agreement. Related to this, we are also interested in how the administration intends to curb 
the future growth of greenhouse gas emissions in countries like China, who would not be subject to the 
same legally binding emissions, but whose emissions will soon eclipse our own.” S. Rep. No. 105-54, at 
10 (1997). 
 31.  The U.S. Senate, by a 95-0 vote, unanimously passed the Byrd–Hagel Resolution which states 
that the United States should not be a signatory to any protocol that does not include binding targets and 
timetables for China and other developing nations as well as industrialized nations, or “would result in 
serious harm to the economy of the United States . . . .” S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). 
 32.  During President Clinton’s term, Vice President Al Gore “symbolically signed” the Kyoto 
Protocol on Nov. 12, 1997 even though it was never intended to be ratified by the United States 
(because of the Byrd-Hagel Resolution).  See Al Gore, Moving Beyond Kyoto, N.Y.TIMES, July 1, 2007, 
at 413. Moreover, the United States originally advocated the use of tradable allowances, which Europe 
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Because of the Senate’s position, at the international level the Obama 
administration continues to insist that China’s legal caps are relevant and 
tied to any U.S. participation in an international agreement.33 
The U.S. Senate’s fear of China, or the China argument, has not only 
prevented America from ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, but, according to 
Energy Secretary Steven Chu, it has also hampered the passage of domestic 
laws.34 Hence, though this Article primarily addresses U.S. opposition to 
international regulation, it has insights useful for domestic regulation as 
well. 
This Article is timely: earlier this year, California established the 
largest cap and trade scheme in the United States to date, a market which is 
expected to generate more than a billion dollars in revenue annually.35 
 
opposed. In the end, the United States repudiated trading and Europe embraced it. See David M. 
Driesen, Sustainable Development and Market Liberalism’s Shotgun Wedding: Emissions Trading 
Under the Kyoto Protocol, 83 IND. L.J. 21, 34 (2008); Sunstein, The Complex Climate Incentives, supra 
note 3, at 1681. 
 33.  In spite of calls by European and African nations to set stronger emission targets, President 
Obama’s negotiators never acceded to the Kyoto Protocol. Senator John Kerry, the principal sponsor of 
the Senate climate bill, stated “‘Having China at the table was the most critical thing because most of 
our colleagues are saying, ‘Well what about China? What about China?’’” Darren Samuelsohn, Obama 
Negotiates ‘Copenhagen Accord’ with Senate Climate Fight in Mind, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/12/21/21climatewire-obama-negotiates-copenhagen-accord-with-
senat-6121.html?pagewanted=all (quoting then Senator John Kerry). 
 34.  The Energy Secretary made these comments in the context of the Senate’s refusal to pass 
President Obama’s proposed domestic cap and trade bill, S. 1733, 111th Cong. (2009), even though the 
House passed it. Cap and Trade War: Team Obama Floats a Carbon Tariff, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 30, 
2009, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123837276242467853.html (“But give Mr. Chu 
credit for candor. He had previously told the New York Times that ‘The concern about cap and trade in 
today’s economic climate is that a lot of money might flow to developing countries in a way that might 
not be completely politically sellable.’”) (quoting Secretary of Energy Steven Chu); Elizabeth 
Williamson, Obama Retreats from Goal of Cap-Trade Bill, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 3, 2010, 12:01 AM), 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704022804575041632860721438.html; Matt Negrin, 
Whatever Happened to Cap and Trade?, ABC NEWS (July 17, 2012), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/OTUS/environment-happened-cap-trade-global- warming/story?id 
=16790018. Fears are fanned on the costs of cap and trade. For example, estimates claim it will cost 
American households an additional $1,761 per annum, more than double the average $900 annual tax 
cut provided by President Obama under the American Recovery Act. Or, cumulatively, the costs are 
estimated at $200 billion to $366 billion per year, or a 15 percent tax increase.  See Declan McCullagh, 
Obama  Admin: Cap  And  Trade  Could  Cost  Families  $1,761  A  Year,  CBS (Sept. 15, 2009, 9:03 
PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-504383_162-5314040-504383.html (citing the Treasury 
Department estimates obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by the Competitive Enterprise 
Unit); Tax Cuts for the Middle Class, WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/taxes (last 
visited Dec. 24, 2013) (“[A] typical [middle class] family making $50,000 a year has received tax cuts 
totaling $3,600 . . . .”).  California provides a notable exception to this federal trend and recently started 
implementing a cap and trade scheme under AB 32. See infra note 35. 
 35.  See California Global Warming Solutions Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 38501 (2006) 
(Assembly Bill 32).  See also Julie Cart, California Becomes First State to Adopt Cap-and-Trade 
Program, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/oct/21/local/la-me-cap-trade-
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President Obama announced that if the Senate does not pass a cap and trade 
law, his Cabinet would take executive action during his State of the Union 
address in 2013.36 The Obama Climate Action Plan announced in June, 
directed the Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”) to issue regulations 
governing power plants. This September, the EPA announced the first of 
these, prescribing carbon pollution standards for new power plants. 
Moreover, the Supreme Court will also be examining this issue - the 
Supreme Court granted certiorari on October 15, 2013, in Utility Air 
Regulatory Group. v. EPA, allowing six lawsuits to challenge the EPA’s 
various greenhouse gas regulations.37 This decision comes close on the 
heels of the D.C. Court of Appeals’ decision in Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation v. EPA in June 201238 where the court reaffirmed the Federal 
Government’s power to impose limits on emissions. This case law clearly 
signals judicial intent to build on the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in 
Massachusetts v. EPA.39 Hence, the time is particularly ripe for the analysis 
in this Article. 
A final note before moving into Part I: this Article will, consistent 
with academic and judicial positions, treat the following as established 
stances. First, this Article will not seek to prove climate change or the 
science behind it. In keeping with the decision in Coalition for Responsible 
Regulation, the “extent to which these changes ‘can be attributed to human-
induced buildup of atmospheric greenhouse gases,’” shall be considered as 
 
20111021; Felicity Barringer, A Grand Experiment to Rein in Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 
2012, at A23. A regional cap and trade system, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (“RGGI”) was 
also adopted by 10 northeastern states with the goal of reducing emissions.  See Robert N. Stavins, A 
Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 
302 (2008). 
 36.  President Barack Obama State of the Union Speech, POLITICO (Feb. 12, 2013, 9:15 PM) 
available at http://www.politico.com/story/2013/02/state-of-the-union-2013-president-barack-obamas-
speechtranscript-text-87550.html.  
 37.  Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102 (D.C. Cir. 2012), cert. granted 
sub nom., Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. v. EPA, 134 S.Ct 468 (U.S. Oct. 15, 2013) (No. 12-1146). 
 38.  Coal. for Responsible Regulation, Inc. v. EPA, 684 F.3d 102, 133–34 (D.C. Cir. 2012) 
(holding that EPA regulations were rational and not arbitrary and requiring the permitting to be 
extended to major emitters). 
 39.  In Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 528 (2007), the Supreme Court held that the 
Environment Protection Agency (“EPA”) had jurisdiction to regulate greenhouse gas emissions 
(because greenhouse gas emissions fell within the definition of “air pollutant” under the Clean Air Act, 
42 U.S.C. §§ 7401–7671g). The Supreme Court further remanded the case to the EPA, and ordered the 
agency to review its contention that it had discretion to decide whether or not to regulate emissions. The 
Court found the current rationale for not regulating to be inadequate and required the agency to 
articulate a reasonable basis in order to avoid regulation. In Coalition for Responsible Regulation, Inc., 
684 F.3d 102 at 133–34, the court went a step further to state the law required the federal government to 
limit emissions. 
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well-established and no longer in question.40 Second, this Article will focus 
on the market and forego digressing into the market versus carbon taxes or 
regulation debates.41 This stand is supported by academics as well as 
President Obama.42 
 
I.  THEORISTS’ ASSUMPTION 
 
The scholarship supporting and opposing U.S. participation in the 
Kyoto Protocol is divided along two lines: justice theory and moral theory. 
Putting forward the classic justice theory position, Eric Posner and Cass 
Sunstein posit, “The Kyoto Protocol imposed no obligations on China, now 
 
 40.  Coal. for Responsible Regulation, 684 F.3d 102 at 119 (citations omitted).  See also id. at 122 
(“In Massachusetts v. EPA the Supreme Court confirmed that EPA may make an endangerment finding 
despite lingering scientific uncertainty. Indeed, the Court held that the existence of ‘some residual 
uncertainty’ did not excuse EPA’s decision to decline to regulate greenhouse gases. Massachusetts v. 
EPA, 549 U.S. at 534, 127 S.Ct 1438. To avoid regulating emissions of greenhouse gases, EPA would 
need to show ‘scientific uncertainty…so profound that it precludes EPA from making a reasoned 
judgment as to whether greenhouse gases contribute to global warming.’ Id. Clearly, then, EPA may 
issue an endangerment finding even while the scientific record still contains at least ‘some residual 
uncertainty.’ Industry Petitioners have shown no more than that.”) After years of debate, this position is 
also now generally accepted in legal scholarship and most articles proceed on the assumption that 
climate science and the role of human activities is well-established. See, e.g., Farber, supra note 5, at 
377; Freeman & Guzman, supra note 5, at 1532; Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1566–67. 
 41.  There is voluminous literature debating the merits of tax or regulatory approaches in contrast 
to market solutions. See generally Reuven S. Avi-Yonah & David M. Uhlmann, Combating Global 
Climate Change: Why a Carbon Tax is a Better Response to Global Warming than Cap and Trade, 28 
STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 3 (2009) (generally arguing for carbon tax rather than cap and trade schemes); David 
M. Driesen, Is Emissions Trading an Economic Incentive Program?: Replacing the Command and 
Control/Economic Incentive Dichotomy, 55 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 289 (1998); Richard Toshiyuki 
Drury et al., Pollution Trading and Environmental Injustice: Los Angeles’ Failed Experiment in Air 
Quality Policy, 9 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y  F. 231 (1999) (criticizing cap and trade based upon the 
specific experience with the Los Angeles Mobile Source Credits “(specifically, the Rule 1610 ‘car 
scrapping’ program) and RECLAIM”). 
 42.  See generally STEWART & WIENER, supra note 29; Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 18; 
Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 29; Stewart, supra note 29; Stavins, supra note 35, at 296; Cass 
R.Sunstein, Democratizing America Through Law, 25 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 949 (1991) (acknowledging 
a flexible option like a global emissions trading system is a central piece of any agreement to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions). See also Thomas Merrill & David M. Schizer, Energy Policy for an 
Economic Downturn: A Proposed Petroleum Fuel Price Stabilization Plan, 27 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 1 
(2010) (“[I]n a recession the appropriate fiscal policy is to cut taxes, not to raise them.”). In fact, David 
Schoenbrod and Richard Stewart criticize the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (or the 
Waxman-Markey Bill) as excessively regulatory rather than providing an efficient market solution. 
Moreover, they point to prior cap and trade successes, such as acid rain causing emissions. David 
Schoenbrod & Richard Stewart, The Cap-and-Trade Bait and Switch, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 24, 2009, 
12:42 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203609204574314312524495276.html. 
Then Presidential candidate Barack Obama stated, “‘a cap-and-trade system is a smarter way of 
controlling pollution’ than ‘top-down’ regulation.” Id. (quoting then Senator Barack Obama). See also 
POLITICO, supra note 36. 
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the biggest emitter, and placed heavy burdens on the United States. In this 
light, the claim that American policy has been negligent, under prevailing 
legal standards, is far-fetched.”43 Posner and Sunstein correctly recognize 
the United States’ concern regarding the costs of reducing emissions, 
stating, “reductions would likely impose especially large costs on the 
United States . . . .”44 Next, without further investigation, they assume 
“costs” means an outflow of U.S. money to other nations.45 They then 
criticize this outflow from the United States as (a) crude means of 
producing redistribution, or (b) problematic because it compels “many 
people who have not acted wrongfully” to pay people who are not victims 
of climate change.46 In short, Posner and Sunstein’s theory is based on the 
assumption that money will flow out of the United States. This argument 
implies that it is unfair for China to receive massive sums of U.S. money.47 
Elsewhere, Sunstein also claims the Kyoto Protocol fails because of this 
requirement that the United States ought to pay other countries (chiefly, 
China).48 In contrast, Sunstein submits that the Montreal Protocol succeeds 
because it did not unfairly insist on U.S. payments to other nations.49 
In sum, Posner and Sunstein conclude justice theory does not support 
payments from the United States to other nations (implicitly, China),50 and 
so, this theory does not back U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol. This 
fact is poignant because, far from opposing the United States’ involvement 
in the climate accord, Posner and Sunstein believe, “an international 
agreement to control greenhouse gases, with American participation, is 
justified, and all things considered, the United States should probably 
participate even if the domestic cost-benefit analysis does not clearly justify 
such participation.”51 
 
 43.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1600. See also Farber, supra note 5, at 390 (critiquing the 
logic in Posner & Sunstein’s argument as incorrectly conflating marginal harm with total harm); Jason 
Scott Johnston, Climate Change Confusion and the Supreme Court: The Misguided Regulation of 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the Clean Air Act, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1, 47–48 (2008). 
 44.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1565. 
 45.  See, e.g., id. at 1565 (“On reasonable assumptions, redistribution from the United States to 
poor people in poor nations would be highly desirable . . . . Many people who have not acted 
wrongfully end up being forced to provide a remedy to many people who have not been victimized.”). 
 46.  Id. 
 47.  In the introduction to their article, Posner and Sunstein set up their theory against the 
backdrop of China. See id. at 1567–68. 
 48.  See Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 3, at 60–61 (discussing the two Protocol’s 
different treatment of the common yet differentiated responsibilities principle). 
 49.  Id. at 47. 
 50.  It is not only this author’s inference that they implicitly oppose payment to China. For 
Farber’s characterization of the justice theorists’ position, see Farber, supra note 5, at 390. 
 51.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1572 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also id. at 
1611–12 (“If the United States agrees to participate in a climate change agreement on terms that are not 
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Dan Farber responds to Posner and Sunstein’s justice argument with a 
moral argument. First, Farber pithily summarizes the justice theorists’ 
argument as follows: “[W]e only have a duty to reduce emissions or assist 
victims of climate change if China reduces emissions . . . .”52 In short, if 
China is not compelled to reduce its emissions, ipso facto, U.S. 
responsibility for its emissions is dissolved.53 
Next, Farber explains his moral response to Posner and Sunstein’s 
justice theory: 
China’s potential responsibility for climate change, however great, 
would not erase our own responsibility, and because in fact our 
emissions will continue to be harmful (and perhaps become even more 
harmful) even if China’s emissions are unchecked. In short, the China 
argument should be rejected as a fallacy in considering American climate 
policy, and in particular should be seen as completely irrelevant to 
whether we have a duty to finance adaptation by developing countries. It 
goes without saying that China’s future emissions are critically important 
to the U.S. and to the world – but our own conduct remains our own 
responsibility.54 
According to Farber: The United States has moral duties to (a) 
“impose reasonable curbs on future emissions” and (b) “help other 
countries, especially poorer countries, adapt to . . . climate change”—duties 
that are independent and “not conditional on whether other countries—in 
particular China—take action.”55 However, this deontic response fails to 
quell the China alarm, a lacuna which Farber acknowledges. He notes that, 
“[W]e also have to be realistic about the extent to which we can expect 
moral considerations to influence policy, especially where large amounts of 
money are involved.”56 
Thus, justice and moral theorists’ position may be summarized as 
follows: (a) Justice theorists maintain they would like the United States to 
participate, but theory does not obligate the United States to join the 
 
in the nation’s interest, but that help the world as a whole, there would be no reason to object . . . .”) 
(emphasis added). 
 52.  Farber, supra note 3, at 16. 
 53.  The China excuse put forward is very similar to the carbon leakage claim that many scholars 
raise. For instance, Posner and Sunstein point out that even if the United States aggressively pursues 
emission reduction, it will not halt global temperature rise if no caps are placed on China’s emissions. 
Similarly, it is argued, any effort at mitigation is futile because it will be overwhelmed by greenhouse 
gases generated elsewhere – especially, because energy intensive industry would relocate to unregulated 
jurisdictions (“leakage problem”).  For a fuller explanation, see, for example, Freeman & Guzman, 
supra note 5, at 1543. See also, Wiener, supra note 3, at 1807–08 (linking directly the China factor and 
the leakage issue.). 
 54.  Farber, supra note 3, at 19–20. 
 55.  Id. at 15. 
 56.  Farber, supra note 5, at 381. 
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Protocol, because of China, (b) Moral theorists contend the United States is 
responsible for its emissions, in spite of the China factor (conceding in 
reality the United States will not ratify a legal solution that does not 
similarly bind China).57 In short, both theories proceed on the presumption 
of massive wealth transfer to China; without any investigation of whether 
this China anxiety is indeed supported by evidence. 
This Article, in contrast, examines the accuracy of this assumption and 
asks whether market facts support the China myth. Part II will therefore 
explain the provisions of the Protocol and the market it established that 
gives rise to the China anxiety. 
 
II.  THE TREATY AND ITS MARKET 
 
The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(“UNFCCC”) is the single largest international treaty executed for the 
purpose of stabilizing and preventing an increase in the greenhouse gas 
concentrations in the atmosphere. The treaty aims to prevent greenhouse 
gas concentration that would cause dangerous anthropogenic interference 
with the climate system.58 The UNFCCC is legally non-binding since it 
does not set any compulsory limits on greenhouse gas emissions for 
individual nations nor does it contain any enforcement mechanism.59 The 
Convention, however, establishes the following: (a) a framework to 
negotiate specific treaties (or “Protocols”) that would set binding limits on 
greenhouse gases, and (b) “a legislative-like body” (or the “Conference of 
Parties” or “COP”) to meet annually for the purpose of implementing the 
UNFCCC goals.60 In the 1997 annual meeting in Japan, the Conference of 
Parties negotiated a legally binding document, the Kyoto Protocol.61 As 
Professor Michael Wara notes, “To date, the most substantial effort to 
 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  See UNFCCC, supra note 16, at art. 2; see also Michael B. Gerrard, Introduction and 
Overview, in GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 1, 17 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (“ [The 
UNFCCC] was opened for signature at the United Nations Conference on Environment and 
Development in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. The United States Senate ratified it on October 7, 1992, and 
President George H.W. Bush signed it less than a week later. It came into force in 1994 and now has 
189 parties.”). 
 59.  See UNFCCC, supra note 16; Kyle W. Danish, The International Regime, in GLOBAL 
CLIMATE CHANGE AND U.S. LAW 31, 33 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007). 
 60.  See Danish, supra note 59, at 33. 
 61.  Though the United States and then Vice President Al Gore played a central role in negotiating 
the Kyoto Protocol, the Senate refused to ratify it. Hence, though Vice President Al Gore “symbolically 
signed” the Protocol, it did not become a part of U.S. law. Thereafter, in March 2001, President George 
W. Bush expressly repudiated it. See supra note 32 and accompanying text; Gerrard, supra note 58, at 
19. 
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address climate change is the Kyoto Protocol . . . . Although not ratified by 
the United States and only recently by Australia, the Protocol was signed 
and ratified by every other large developed country and entered into force 
on February 16, 2005.”62 
The main controversies surrounding the Kyoto Protocol arise from the 
following three provisions: First, in order to reduce emissions to a level that 
is “30 percent below what would have occurred under [a] ‘business as 
usual’ scenario,” each country agreed to reduce its emissions by a 
percentage below its 1990 emissions.63 The United States for instance 
agreed to reduce its emissions to 7 percent below its 1990 emissions.64 
Countries having different national targets, created a first set of 
controversies, and aggravated the second problem presented by developed 
and developing countries being subject to unalike obligations. 
Second, furthering the “common but differentiated responsibilities” 
principle originally expressed in the Convention, the Protocol puts 
developed and developing countries in two different categories.65 
Advanced economies have binding targets, while developing nations have 
optional goals.66 The developing countries that signed the Convention are 
called “Non-Annex I Countries” (“developing nations” or “developing 
countries”).67 The United States objects to being included in Annex I of the 
Convention (with the concomitant binding targets), because of the third 
factor, the emissions market.68 
Third, to provide countries with flexible options to meet their targets, 
the Kyoto Protocol allows countries to: (a) document and receive credit for 
the emissions they reduced, and (b) possibly trade any surplus credits.69 For 
 
 62.  Wara, supra note 17, at 1760 (emphasis added). 
 63.  See Gerrard, supra note 58, at 18.  Though nations should typically agree to reduce emissions 
below the 1990 emissions baseline, there are some notable exceptions. Some parties such as Australia, 
Russia and others have not only negotiated no reductions, but even an increase in total caps. See Wara, 
supra note 17, at 1767 n.38 (“These nations include Australia (108 percent), Iceland (110 percent), New 
Zealand (100 percent), Norway (101 percent), Russia (100 percent), and Ukraine (100 percent).”). See 
id. at 1766–77. 
 64.  Gerrard, supra note 58, at 18. 
 65.  Id. See generally Gore, supra note 32 (arguing that the principle of common yet differentiated 
responsibilities is here to stay and is relevant to any future treaty). 
 66.  See UNFCCC, supra note 16, art. 4, Annex I (describing the commitments to be given from 
the countries in Annex I). 
 67.  See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art.12. 
 68.  See, e.g., Sunstein, Of Montreal and Kyoto, supra note 3, at 6–7 (arguing that while he 
believed a global emissions market would benefit the world at large, for the United States the costs of 
the Kyoto Protocol and its emissions market would outweigh the benefits). 
 69.  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at arts. 17, 6, 12. See also Aarthi S. Anand, Carbon Credit Not 
A License to Pollute, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Mar. 4, 2010, at 11 (“Cap and trade mechanisms . . . 
should be seen as a bridge . . . enabling industry and nations to move to green energy. . . . Countries are 
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example, suppose the United Kingdom’s target is to reduce its emissions by 
100 tonnes, and it succeeds in lowering its emissions by 110 tonnes. In that 
case, the United Kingdom could sell the extra 10 tonnes to any other nation 
that fails to achieve its target. Since developing nations do not have binding 
commitments under Article 3 of the Protocol, they could potentially sell all 
the permits they earned.70 This aspect shall be further examined in the 
subsequent paragraphs. 
The Kyoto Protocol provides two types of flexible mechanisms, 
namely, the clean development mechanism (“CDM”)71 and the joint 
implementation mechanism (“JI”).72 As shown in Figure 1 below, the CDM 
and JI systems are designed along similar lines with one distinction—
whether the countries selling and buying the permits are developing or 
advanced nations (i.e., listed as an Annex I or a Non-Annex I country).73 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
not compelled to purchase credits – rather the international treaty terms provide for emission reduction 
targets. If nations cannot meet targets, trading mechanisms allow them to purchase these credits rather 
than incur undefined penalties for default. Nations and industries would be unwilling to sign up for 
legal commitments absent from a clear make-up mechanism. Credit trading offers a workable Plan B . . 
. .”). 
 70.  See Danish, supra note 59, at 46 (“Through the CDM, Annex I governments . . . can purchase 
‘Certified Emission Reductions’ generated by emission reduction projects in non-Annex I countries.”). 
See also Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 3 (providing commitments only for Annex I countries). 
 71.  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 12. 
 72.  See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 6 (“[A]ny Party included in Annex I may transfer to, 
or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing 
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases 
in any sector of the economy . . . .”). See also Danish, supra note 59, at 44–46 (explaining Article 6 
rules for joint implementation). 
 73.  The differences between the platforms are over-simplified for the discussion in this Article. 
International Emissions Trading (“IET”) is a third flexible mechanism available under the Protocol. 
However, unlike the other two schemes, under IET each Annex I Party was allotted a fixed number of 
allowable emissions over a five year commitment period. IET does not permit parties to earn additional 
units (to sell them on the market). Plus, China is not an Annex I Party, and so cannot sell on this 
platform. As a result, IET is largely unopposed by the United States and thus is not included in this 
Article. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 17, Annex I.  See also Danish, supra note 59, at 42 
(“The Article 17 trading system is very similar to the Sulfur Dioxide Emissions Program established 
under Title IV of the [U.S.] Clean Air Act. Under each program, the regulated entities are required to 
hold certain permits to cover their emissions. Under the Protocol, the regulated entities are national 
governments, while the Title IV system regulates power plants. Under the Protocol, the permits are 
AAUs [Assigned Amount Units]; the Title IV system uses ‘allowances.’ Each program allocates a 
certain amount of permits to its regulated entities and allows the entities to trade them freely.”). 
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FIGURE 1 
Market Seller Buyer 
CDM Developing country 
e.g. China 
Industrialized nation  
e.g. United Kingdom 
(U.S., if it agrees) 
JI Industrialized nation Industrialized nation 
   
In sum, the CDM platform is utilized when an industrialized nation (or 
Annex I) buys permits from an upcoming economy (or Non-Annex I 
country). As Figure 1 indicates, the JI market is used when both parties to 
the sale are advanced countries. The United States mostly opposes the 
CDM platform, hence, this Article will focus on this market specifically. 
As explained earlier, for easy reading, this Article will use the term “carbon 
market” to refer to the CDM and the deals in this market.74 
In order to put the U.S. reaction to the carbon market in perspective, 
the following aspects are worth mentioning. If the United States’ efforts 
fall short and it is compelled to purchase make-up permits from the market, 
the United States has the option to buy the credits from other advanced 
nations. The carbon market transactions will only come into play if all the 
following conditions are met: (a) the number of tonnes reduced by all the 
domestic effort in the United States is added up, and (b) this sum, or the 
total number of tonnes reduced by the entire U.S. domestic sector, is less 
than the target set for the United States, then (c) the gap has to be bridged 
through market purchases, and (d) the United States chooses to purchase 
the credits from permits earned by China rather than from the United 
Kingdom or the Netherlands.75 However, arithmetically, the United States 
does have a valid point—since advanced countries have binding targets, 
supply of excess permits from these nations may be less than the credits 
from China.76 
This brings us to the heart of U.S. objections to the Kyoto Protocol. 
China, as a Non-Annex I country, can sell its permits, and the United States 
fears that China will be the biggest beneficiary and recipient of U.S. money 
if the United States signs the Kyoto Protocol.77 China accounts for more 
 
 74.  “Carbon market” references in this Article explicitly exclude JI and IET. 
 75.  See infra Parts III.A–B for list of countries that own a significant portfolio of credits. 
 76.  For instance, China earned over 50 percent of the credits initially awarded, which is 
substantially more than countries such as Vietnam or Malaysia that account for 2–3 percent of the total 
carbon initiatives in the world. See infra Figures 4,5,6. 
 77.  For example, legal scholarship has proceeded on the presumption that money will indeed flow 
into China if the U.S. ratifies the Protocol. Moral theorists, like Farber, argue the United States should 
still ratify the Protocol because it is morally responsible. Justice theorists, like Posner and Sunstein, 
argue that justice theory does not require the United States to participate, so long as China will unfairly 
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than 50 percent of the total permits that the United Nations has issued; a 
fact that further increases the United States’ disquiet regarding the Kyoto 
Protocol.78 The U.S. Senate summarized its objection as follows: 
The Senate strongly believes that the [Kyoto Protocol] proposals under 
negotiation, because of the disparity of treatment between Annex I 
Parties and Developing Countries and the level of required emission 
reductions, could result in serious harm to the United States economy, 
including significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and 
consumer costs.79 
In order to parse out the U.S. objection, some carbon market context 
and background would be helpful. Hence, the following Part A will discuss 
the concept of a carbon credit, Part B will highlight the key features of the 
market and the types of initiatives that received credit in the U.N. market, 
and Part C will discuss the UNFCCC registry which provides a way to 
track the ownership and transfer of credits.  
 
A. “Carbon Credit” – Concept and Background for the Study 
In countries that have signed the Kyoto Protocol, the Executive Board 
issues “certificates” or “credits” or “carbon credits” for every tonne of 
greenhouse gas emissions that are reduced. 80 After the Executive Board 
 
benefit at the expense of the United States. But the scholarship proceeds on the assumption that China 
will gain the moneys the United States pays to purchase credits to make up for its high emissions. For 
the Senate’s opposition to the Protocol and cap and trade, see discussions on S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. 
(1997) (enacted), and the Energy Secretary’s comments on the Senate rejecting the cap and trade bill in 
2010, supra note 34. 
 78.  China accounts for 50.26 percent or 2,161 projects as on July 9, 2012. See infra Figure 4. See 
also infra Figures 5 and 6 for updated statistics for the periods until Sep. 28, 2012, and Aug. 31, 2012, 
respectively. Figures 5 and 6 show the Chinese grip is unlikely to be relinquished anytime in the near 
future. However, it is also equally true (as shown in the Figures 4, 5, and 6), other developing countries 
have earned 50 percent of the credits to date; India and Brazil, for example, own substantial portfolios. 
Plausibly, the United States could purchase credits from these countries instead of China. 
 79.  S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted). See also Wara, supra note 17, at 1797–98 
(criticizing the Protocol’s market; specifically, CDM for recognizing and awarding credits to projects 
with questionable environmental benefits). 
 80.  As discussed in Part I, this Article will confine itself to Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) 
(or credits that were traded on the CDM platform) since these credits are the chief source of U.S. 
resistance to the Kyoto Protocol. However, a number of non-U.N. or optional offset systems 
(commonly known as “voluntary offsets”) also exist. Since the United States is not subject to 
mandatory caps, the few American firms that buy credits opt to buy voluntary offsets (and utilize it for 
marketing purposes). Companies buy CERs to meet mandatory targets under the Protocol, voluntary 
offsets or credits in contrast are optional. NICHOLAS LINACRE, ET AL., supra note 20, at 9 (estimates the 
CDM market accounts for 87 percent of the transactions from 2005–2010, which is valued at $26.5 
billion, and voluntary offsets account for the remaining 13 percent or $4.1 billion in transactions.). 
Moreover, voluntary offsets are issued and regulated by non-U.N or private bodies. As a practical 
measure, industrial activities that (a) do not fulfill the United Nations’ rules or (b) are located in 
countries that are not party to the Convention (such as Turkey) obtain voluntary credits. A number of 
non-U.N. or private organizations issue voluntary credits (marking them as “Gold Standard,” etc.). 
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and multiple bodies scrutinize the activity, the Executive Board issues these 
carbon credit certificates. The predominant form of carbon credit 
certificates are Certified Emission Reductions (“CERs”). In principle, the 
Board provides one credit for every tonne of carbon dioxide reduced.81 Or, 
1 CER = 1 credit = equivalent to 1 tonne of CO2 reduced.82 The onus is on 
the party requesting the credit to prove that its initiatives fulfilled the 
various standards and conditions outlined below. Since the Protocol sets 
emission reduction targets for countries, countries that surpass or fall 
behind the agreed number can trade these credits on the UNFCCC’s trading 
platform; encouraging countries to increase their effort to curb rising 
emissions. 
In keeping with industry parlance, this Article shall refer to various 
types of activities that are recognized by the Board and earning credits as 
“projects” or “industry” or “industrial activities.” For readers’ ease, this 
Article will focus on the industrial activities that earn credits and will draw 
on illustrations from the industrial sector.83 Before turning to the UNFCCC 
registry and carbon market process in Part C, it is important to briefly 
acknowledge a possible criticism. Scholars point out that the market 
 
 81.  The Kyoto Protocol covers not only carbon dioxide but also a “basket” of six greenhouse 
gases – methane (CH4), nitrous oxide (N2O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and 
sulfur hexafluoride (SF6), in addition to carbon dioxide. See Danish, supra note 60, at 38 (“Each Annex 
I party’s commitment applies on the basis of a ‘basket’ of six GHGs . . . The Intergovernmental Panel 
on Climate Change has determined the global warming potential for each of these types of GHGs 
relative to carbon dioxide. Adopting this approach, the Protocol expresses each party’s limit in the form 
of a certain amount of ‘carbon dioxide equivalent’ tons of GHG emissions. In addition, for HFCs, 
PFCs, and SF6, the Protocol allows the use of 1995 as a base year, which has the effect of easing the 
stringency of requirements for these GHGs because, for most countries, emissions of those GHGs were 
higher in 1995 than 1990.”); Wara, supra note 17, at 1766. For easy comparison, this Article will also 
similarly utilize carbon dioxide as the relevant unit. 
 82.  Fast Facts & Figures, UNFCCC, http://unfccc.int/essential_background/basic_facts_figures 
/items/6246txt.php (last visited Dec. 26, 2013) (explaining the CO2 equivalent concept as follows: 
“GHG emissions/removals can be expressed either in physical units (such as grams, tonnes, etc.) or in 
terms of CO2 equivalent (grams CO2 equivalent, tonnes CO2 equivalent, etc.). The conversion factor 
from physical units to CO2 equivalent is the Global Warming Potential (GWP) of the corresponding 
GHG. If X Gg of CH4 is to be expressed in terms of CO2 equivalent, then it is multiplied by 21, which 
is GWP of CH4 over 100 years timescale.”). 
 83.  To date, industrial activities like renewable energy power plants and energy efficiency 
improvements dominate the list. See Figure 2. For most recent trends in the technologies that were 
registered until Jan. 31, 2012, see Trend of Types of Projects Registered and Registering, CDM 
Insights, UNFCCC, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/files/201301/regtypenum.pdf (last visited 
Dec. 26, 2013). However, it must be noted, the Board recognizes and issues credits for activities in 
different economic sectors, including transport afforestation though industrial activities currently earn 
the maximum number of credits. See Figure 2. The industrial sector may be dominant because the 
Protocol processes require the party to precisely estimate the carbon dioxide reduced by the activity and 
it is arguably more difficult to measure the tonnes of carbon dioxide reduced by trees than it is from 
metered power consuming factories. 
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recognizes and issues certificates to activities that do not really reduce 
emissions.84 In support, they point to hydrofluorocarbon (“HFC”) projects, 
which earned credits even though HFC activities have dubious 
environmental effects.85 But these critics ignore and fail to acknowledge 
that while HFCs may have received some credits, renewable energy and 
energy efficiency make up the lion’s share of the credits.86 According to 
United Nations, renewable energy has consistently accounted for 60 
percent of all carbon projects, and has risen to 80 percent more recently.87 
This survey is based on market observations, so, any criticism that 
certain type of projects, (such as HFCs discussed earlier) ought not to be 
provided credits does not affect the conclusions here.88 Even if the criticism 
on types of projects is accepted, and projects that in the critics’ opinion 
ought not to have earned credits are eliminated, the percentage of credits 
sold forward will not change dramatically. In sum, this Article is unaffected 
by this potential criticism. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 84.  Wara, supra note 17, at 1797; Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5. 
 85.  See, e.g., Wara, supra note 17, at 1779–80 (explaining that adipic acid and 
chlorodifluoromethane industries, which have bad environmental impacts, have earned a large number 
of credits). “The very large projects dominating the supply of CERs are confined primarily to two 
relatively obscure industries—adipic acid and chlorodifluoromethane (HCFC-22) production. Adipic 
acid is the feedstock for the production of nylon-66 and releases abundant N2O as a production 
byproduct. HCFC-22 has two major applications. It is one of two major refrigerants that was phased in 
to replace the CFC’s under the auspices of the Montreal Protocol to Protect on Substances that Deplete 
the Ozone Layer. HCFC-22 is also the primary feedstock in the production of PTFE, more commonly 
known by its Dupont brand name, Teflon. HCFC- 22 production inevitably produces HFC-23 as an 
unwanted byproduct. These two relatively small industries represent nearly 55 percent of the supply of 
issued CERs in the CDM to date.” Id. at 1778–79.  See generally Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5. 
 86.  See infra Figure 2; UNEP Risø Centre, CDM Projects by Type, UNEP RISØ CDM/JI 
PIPELINES DATABASE AND ANALYSIS, Feb.1, 2013. 
 87.  See UNEP Risø CDM/JI Pipelines Analysis and Database: CDM Projects by Type, UNEP 
RISØ CENTRE, http://www.cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-type.htm (last updated Dec. 1, 2013) (Number 
(%) of CDM Projects In Each Category of Types). 
 88.  See infra Parts III.B.2–3. 
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FIGURE 2: Types of Activities89 
 
B. Powers of Attorney and Project Stages 
The Protocol awards one credit for every tonne of carbon dioxide 
reduced. Per the market rules, the party requesting the credits: (a) 
completes a number of steps, and (b) submits a full set of documents. 
Furthermore, the Board, national agencies, and independent technical 
experts scrutinize the documents submitted. It is only after all these bodies 
approve the project that the Board awards credits.90 While passing AB 32 
creating its cap and trade scheme, California adopted similar procedures 
including scrutiny by independent technical experts and multiple 
organizations. Hence, the Protocol’s procedures are relevant to domestic 
U.S. regulation too.91 
Moreover, the Board has created an online Registry that discloses 
various documents that parties file (describing the project, technology that 
will be used, location, estimate of tonnes of emissions anticipated to be 
reduced), the approvals, and the decisions received from the technical 
 
 89.  See UNEP RISØ CENTRE, supra note 87. The data included in this graph adds up to 101.3 
percent. Since this graph is extracted from the UN website, the author retained it without amendment. 
 90.  See, e.g., Anand, supra note 69 (“CDM aims at high credibility through requiring approvals 
from national governments, the UN and designated operational entities (DOEs). They are chosen for 
technical expertise and of high standing, such as Deloitte’s TECO, DNV, etc, [sic] and provide final 
checks, verifying and certifying reductions.”); Aarthi S. Anand, Will India Capitalise on Cancun 
Gains?, NEW INDIAN EXPRESS, Jan. 28, 2011, at 11 (“The UNFCCC process provided for strong roles 
for independent third party agencies, a singular achievement. Third party agencies (or Designated 
Operational Entities) are involved at every stage, from initial verification, determining technology and 
project eligibility to final approval prior to credit issuance.”). 
 91.  See Cart, supra note 35. 
Demand-side EE: 4%
Fuel Switch: 2%
Supply-side EE 7%
CH4 reduction &
Cement & Coal
mine/bed: 16%
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agencies.92 Parties also lodge the powers of attorney with regard to the 
carbon credits at this Registry, providing a rich source of data to check who 
owns these credits and whether the numbers support the China argument. 
The following Part B will explain how the dataset was collated. Part 
B.1. shall explain how the UNFCCC maintains a Registry that contains 
powers of attorney forms, which enables us to track ownership and sale of 
credits. Part B.2. will briefly explain the crediting cycle and various 
milestones that must be achieved before a credit is issued—this context is 
necessary to understand the analysis in Part III. 
Part B.2. will provide one additional benefit—when describing the 
crediting steps, it will highlight the documentary and approval mechanisms 
that the Protocol establishes in order to ensure integrity in the market. This 
is important because it addresses the main charge that critics levy against 
carbon trading. Commentators often chastise the existing system, and raise 
doubts on whether there are sufficient checks to verify the project details 
provided by owners, or to assess and calculate the number of credits that 
should be awarded.93 And so, this Part will shed light on the documents and 
multiple tiers of permissions that the Protocol insists upon, which enhance 
the transparency and integrity of the carbon markets – an aspect 
underemphasized in current literature.94 
Figure 3 below provides a bird’s eye-view of the crediting stages. 
Phases (1) Registry and (4) Powers of Attorney are most relevant to 
understand the analysis later in Part III, and so, Part B.1. will focus on 
these phases. The following Part B.2. will examine the other project phases, 
documents and agencies’ approvals; background pertinent to this Article. 
 
 
 
 
 
 92.  For forms describing the project that must be completed in order to earn credits, see Rules and 
Reference: CDM Forms, UNFCC, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/PDDs_Forms/index.html (last 
visited Dec. 26, 2013). 
 93.  See, e.g., Wara, supra note 17, at 1803 (pointing out that market participants often act 
strategically to generate credits for activities that have no merit); Rosenthal & Lehren, supra note 5. 
 94.  The Kyoto Protocol rules create various checks and processes to bolster integrity in the 
carbon market, which formed the basis for an earlier talk. Aarthi S. Anand, Remarks at Transparency 
International’s 14th Annual Anti-Corruption Conference: Getting Carbon Market Governance Right 
from Day One (Nov. 12, 2010). A few experts disapprove of the complex system and the higher 
transaction costs it creates.  See, e.g., NICHOLAS LINACRE ET AL., supra note 20, at 41 (describing 
disruption, bureaucracy, and controversy in carbon markets in 2010); McNish, supra note 17, at 391; 
INT’L EMISSIONS TRADING ASS’N, STATE OF THE CDM 2009: REFORMING THE PRESENT AND 
PREPARING FOR THE FUTURE 3–4 (2009), available at http://www.ieta.org/index.php? 
option=com_content&view=article&id=77%3Astate-of-the-cdm-2009&catid=27%3Aarchived-
reports&Itemid=93. 
Anand - Fin
Fall 2013]
 
 
1. R
firms to
detailin
docume
and doc
before 
Kyoto 
empow
(“Regis
disclose
(includi
experts
 Ow
buyer (
 
 95.  T
provide a b
size (or me
For more d
 96.  K
 97.  T
(b) disclos
verificatio
that are req
al (Do Not Delete) 
     THE U.S., CH
egistered P
 file building
g the activ
nts” or “proj
uments need
credits are i
Protocol est
ers the latt
try”).96 The 
s the comp
ng the docum
’ audit reports
ners draw up
if credits are
he technical term
rief description o
gawatt) is being b
etails on the type
yoto Protocol, su
he Registry perf
es the data on all
n report reports. S
uired at various s
INA, AND TH
FIGURE 3: C
owers of Att
 plans, carbo
ity for wh
ect documen
ed for registr
ssued, shall 
ablishes the
er to set-u
Registry rec
lete set of 
ents the pa
 etc.).97 
 powers of at
 presold), an
 for these docum
f the proposed ac
uilt instead of a c
s of documents, se
pra note 4, at art.
orms the followin
 the projects, incl
ee infra Part I.B.
tages of the accred
E FUTURE OF
DM Project 
orney. Simila
n rules insist
ich credits 
ts”).95 The v
ation, as wel
be described
 carbon ma
p, operate 
ords all acti
documents 
rties submit 
torney in fav
d these instr
ents is “Project 
tivity – for instanc
oal power project
e infra note 98. 
 12. 
g functions: (a) re
uding all the proje
2 for more inform
itation cycle. 
 THE KYOTO P
Stages 
r to local la
 industries su
are claimed
arious types
l as the appro
 in Part I.B
rket and B
and mainta
vities that e
on the UN
for registrati
or of either a
uments are 
Design Documen
e, a renewable en
, along with some
cords all the proj
ct documents, ag
ation on the docu
7/17/2014  10:2
ROTOCOL 
ws that requ
bmit docume
 (“registrat
 of informat
vals and pha
.2. Notably, 
oard, and a
in a Regis
arn credits 
FCCC web
on, independ
n employee o
lodged with 
ts,” or “PDD.” P
ergy plant of a ce
 technical informa
ects registered so
encies’ validation
ments, and appro
1 AM 
23 
 
ire 
nts 
ion 
ion 
ses 
the 
lso 
try 
and 
site 
ent 
r a 
the 
DDs 
rtain 
tion. 
 far; 
 and 
vals 
Anand - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/17/2014  10:21 AM 
24 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:1 
Registry.98 The Board accepts powers of attorney in a specific format.99 
This form names: (a) the party with the right to transfer the credits (the 
buyer), and (b) party authorized to communicate with regard to the 
project.100 Since the first right or power to authorize the transfer of credits 
is the most important power tied to title, this data-point is the principal 
focus of this study. 
Notably, this form can be filed very early. Experienced carbon traders 
and buyers insist that sellers sign and deposit this form with the Registry.101 
This power of attorney provides buyers signing a forward contract the most 
legally secure mechanism to lock in the sellers. 
Remarkably, this Article is the first initiative to comb through the 
Registry and the legal instruments to track the sale of credits. The 
following Part B.2. will include a brief synopsis of the crediting cycle to 
provide context for the empirical analysis in Part III. 
 
2. Project Phases. In the carbon project cycle, registration is the most 
important milestone. In order to succeed in registering their projects (to 
earn credits), owners must furnish documentary proof describing the 
project, and justify on what basis they claim the activity will reduce 
emissions, and provide clear figures to support their claim. Moreover, as 
shall be described below, a number of national, UN bodies and third party 
agencies must be convinced by the party’s claim before the project will be 
registered.  Because of the detailed scrutiny involved, conceivably, clearing 
 
 98.  This form is called a Statement of the Modalities of Communication or simply, the Modalities 
of Communication. For the latest sample form, see Modalities of Communication Form (Version 02.1), 
CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC (Mar. 16, 2012), available at http://cdm.unfccc.int/Reference/P 
DDs_Forms/Registration/reg_form19.pdf. 
 99.  Id. 
 100.  The three types of powers that can be granted to a third party are as follows: 
“(a) Communicate in relation to requests for forwarding of CER 
(b) Communicate in relation to requests for addition and/or voluntary withdrawal of project participants 
and focal points, as well as changes to company names, legal status, contact details and specimen 
signatures 
(c) Communicate on all other project or programme related matters not covered by (a) or (b) above.” Id. 
at 1.. 
 101.  Savvy traders include clauses to this effect in the purchase agreement, including as a 
condition precedent for the contract. Telephone Interview with a member of senior management and the 
negotiating team at one of the prominent international carbon trading firms (Feb. 05, 2013) [hereinafter 
Interview with Carbon Trader]. See also E-mail Interview with Paul Curnow, Partner, Baker & 
McKenzie (Feb. 18, 2013) (“Generally, (and this practice continues till date), Annex I Buyers 
[developed countries] insist on being named as the focal point in the Modalities of Communication, 
with the rights delegated from the seller (and any other project participants) to instruct the Board in 
relation to the forwarding of credits from the project. Historically, Chinese sellers have been prepared to 
give sole delegated authority, or full authority to instruct the Board with regard to issuing and 
distributing the credits.”). 
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this hurdle provides a good signal on whether the project will ultimately 
earn credits.102 Though there is some flexibility on when parties need to 
register their projects (either before or shortly after putting up the plant), 
most parties choose to register early.103 
First, the party seeking the credits must furnish detailed documentation. 
The firm submits detailed documents substantiating its claim to receive 
credits, including an estimate of the emissions that will be avoided.104 For 
example, a corporation that constructs a 20-megawatt solar power project 
will submit an estimate of the emissions that would result if a coal plant is 
built to generate equivalent energy.105 The difference in emissions between 
the potential coal plant and the actual solar plant built will be treated as the 
project’s estimated emission reductions.106 The firm receives one credit for 
every metric tonne of carbon dioxide emissions displaced.107 The party will 
 
 102.  CDM Project Cycle, UNFCCC, http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/diagram.html (last visited Dec. 
26, 2013). See United Nations Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties to the 
Kyoto Protocol on its First Session, Montreal, Can., Nov. 28–Dec. 10, 2005, Action Taken by the 
Conference of the Parties Serving as the Meeting of the Parties, U.N. Doc. 
FCCC/KP/CMP/2005/8/Add.1., Addendum, Part II (Mar. 30, 2006). The party initiates the registration 
process by submitting Project Design Documents and supporting documents to the third party entity 
appointed for validation. A vast majority of projects that are deemed ineligible and rejected by the 
Executive Board are refused at this stage. In short, this phase poses the biggest hurdle for a project to 
secure credits. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101. 
 103.  Parties may apply before or shortly after construction. However, the Kyoto Protocol excludes 
past projects or those already constructed. The additionality condition excludes prior projects. See 
Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, Art. 12 para. 5(c); What is Additionality?, CDM RULEBOOK, BAKER & 
MCKENZIE, http://cdmrulebook.org/84 (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). Moreover, as carbon experts 
confirm, “seeking early registration prior to construction was (and still is) the common market practice. 
Indeed, emission reduction purchase agreements are typically structured on a conditional basis – with 
explicit conditions precedent involving certain milestones being achieved before the credit sale and 
purchase obligation becomes legally effective, or before any advance payment would be made. The 
most significant milestone used is achieving registration. Several additional milestones spread out over 
the validation and registration cycle (getting the Annex I and Host Country approval letters) give buyers 
flexibility in being able to terminate and exit the agreement if projects were not ultimately successful in 
obtaining registration.” Interview with Paul Curnow, supra note 101. 
 104.  The party submits an estimate of the emissions reduced by the project. In order to estimate the 
same, the party shows a scenario reasonably representing the anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions 
that will occur in the absence of the project (“Baseline”). Utilizing this Baseline, the party calculates 
and submits an estimate of the emissions that will be reduced by the project (“Baseline Study”). 
 105.  For the purpose of this discussion, an over-simplified illustration (that omitted the complex 
set of factors used by the Board) is provided. For an elaborate discussion on Baseline processes, see 
McNish, supra note 17, at 404–05. 
 106.  However, final certificates are issued after verifying the details of the actual plant built and 
units of power consumed, an additional safeguard included by the market rules. See also infra note 142 
and accompanying text (discussing Post-Registration Phases). Some scholars argue parties manipulated 
the system by producing false baselines. See, e.g., Wara, supra note 17, at 1781–85. Since this Article 
analyzes deals in the marketplace, and does not base any conclusion on the types of projects, any 
criticism leveled against the types of projects do not affect this study. Moreover, the results of this 
survey will show little change even if these criticized projects are excluded. 
 107.  For readers’ ease, this example is evidently over-simplified. In practice, the Board’s decisions 
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include a monitoring plan describing the procedures that will be undertaken 
during the project’s lifetime.108 Second, the documents must be examined 
and approved by the following three groups: (i) a technical organization 
belonging to the select list maintained by the United Nations (“independent 
technical firm or expert”)109 to validate the documents;110 (ii) local or 
national government authorities who confirm that the party has complied 
with and held a stakeholder consultation as per local norms; and (iii) even 
after these approvals are obtained, the Board retains full discretion to 
decide whether or not to register the project. In short, a project is registered 
only after all these bodies decide that the proposed activity will result in 
reducing emissions.111 Moreover, parties continue to monitor the project 
and independent experts conduct final audits before the Board issues 
credits. 
Third, the activity has to be verified and certified. For the carbon 
project’s lifetime, the industrial corporation collects data and continues to 
monitor the project, as per the plan the Board approved at the time of 
 
have created a body of rulings and precedent to calculate the tonnes of emissions displaced. This 
general rule, however, suffices for the purpose of this Article. 
 108.  This party adheres to the monitoring plan during the project lifetime, which will be verified. 
For a discussion on the verification and certification phases, see infra  note 142 and accompanying text. 
 109.  The technical term for these agencies is “Designated Operational Entities.” These agencies 
audit the project at two stages: (1) initial document scrutiny – a process called validation, which is 
necessary for, and conducted prior to registration; and (2) final verification. This Article will generally 
refer to them as “agencies.” Occasionally when the context so requires, these agencies shall be referred 
to specifically, as “validation agencies” or “verification agencies.” Both validation and verification 
agencies are drawn from the same list of accredited agencies maintained by the United Nations. Parties 
have the option to hire different validation and verification agencies. List of DOEs, UNFCCC, http:// 
cdm.unfccc.int/DOE/list/index.html (last visited Dec. 26, 2013). 
 110.  These agencies have the power to reject the project if, in the agency’s opinion, the project 
fails to meet certain standards. This stage is called “validation” and is conducted as follows: (a) The 
industry owner engages one of the agencies. (b) The owner then asks the agency to submit a request 
(“validation report”) to the Board to register the project. (c) The agency possesses the power to decide 
whether or not the project meets certain standards. (d) Optional initial verification - The industrial 
corporation at its discretion, could also request the agency to in limine determine whether the project 
fulfills the criteria required at later stages. Essentially, the agency determines whether the steps for final 
verification (needed to issue credits) are in place. For instance, whether the monitoring plan approved 
for data collection and management system is in place for successful verification and certification. 
While this initial verification report is not conclusive, it provides early warning. Conceivably, this may 
be in effect for the Chinese projects analyzed here. Carbon credit traders frequently develop the project 
and also accept project risks. Hence, buyers often include a clause insisting on initial verification report 
as a condition precedent in transaction documents; providing grounds to terminate the forward purchase 
obligation, if the third party verification agency provides a negative finding. See generally THE GOLD 
STANDARD, VALIDATION & VERIFICATION MANUAL FOR CDM PROJECTS (2006), available at 
http://www.cdmgoldstandard.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/GS-VVM-CER.pdf. 
 111.  The Board accepts and registers the project (or requires revisions to the document) or rejects 
it as ineligible for credits. If the Board approves a revised Project Design Document re-submitted by the 
owner, the revised one is treated as the PDD for all accreditation purposes. 
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registration.112 Once the power project is running, the industrial corporation 
will hire an independent technical firm to verify  the emissions reduced.113 
The independent technical firms frequently conduct site visits to measure 
the emissions reduced by the plant.114 The actual plant constructed 
determines the number of credits that are receivable, and supersedes 
estimates submitted at the time of registration.115 Upon receiving the 
technical expert’s final verification and certification reports, the Board will 
credit an equivalent number of credits into the owner’s account.116 
Fourth, after the credits are issued, they are held in and bought and sold 
through credit accounts established and maintained by the Board. When 
credits are traded, they are essentially transferred from sellers’ to buyers’ 
accounts. Sellers lodge powers of attorney in favor of buyers, as earlier 
discussed in Part I. The Board only accepts instructions to transfer credits 
from entities named in the power of attorney forms deposited by sellers. 
All powers of attorney are a matter of public record and available on 
the Registry website. The following Part III will shed light on the 
distribution of credits issued so far; particularly, Chinese entities earned a 
 
 112.  This plan is called “Monitoring Plan.” The Board’s permission is required for the entire set of 
registration documents including the Monitoring Plan (and any revisions to it). In practice, changes to 
the approved plan are discouraged. The agency scrutinizes the project far more closely at the next stage, 
when verifying the project, if the party amends the plan. 
 113.  Regarding the method utilized to estimate the final number of credits, the following two 
clarifications are important. One, the number of credits finally issued will depend upon the actual 
project constructed (and not merely the estimate submitted at the time of registration).  See illustration 
discussed infra note 115. Two, the final number will be calculated as follows. The agency measures the 
actual number of units of energy produced (by say, the solar power plant) (“a”). The agency then 
utilizes the figures approved in the Baseline Study, i.e., the emissions that would have resulted if coal 
power is utilized to produce equal units of energy (“b”). The difference between the above two numbers 
will be utilized to calculate the number of credits: emissions reduced = b - a. 
 114.  Also called “verification report” and “certification report,” respectively. See also Anand, 
supra note 69 (“The annual emission reduction claim made by the owner will be verified by a 
designated third-party prior to credit issuance.”). 
 115.  Illustration: The firm may have planned to construct a 50-megawatt solar plant but finally 
built a 20-megawatt plant. In that case, the party will earn credits for the 20-megawatt plant that is 
finally constructed. 
 116.  Parties (and the Executive Board) determine the frequency and timing when third-party 
agencies are hired to verify and certify the credits, based on project size and economic considerations, 
on a quarterly, semi-annual or annual basis. Industrial corporations often prefer to outsource the carbon 
development work to carbon specialists (or traders). These traders engage agencies on a retainer basis 
and so are able to quickly complete verification and obtain credits. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra 
note 101. This business advantage may be criticized, but has hitherto not been noticed by scholars or the 
general press. Moreover, as a carbon expert points out: “[v]erification and certification can only be 
carried out on an ex-post-basis, i.e., the registered project must demonstrate it has achieved historical 
emission reduction over a specific period. Earlier, it was expected verification and certification will be 
carried out quarterly or bi-annually. However, due to the higher-than-expected costs and bottle-necks 
due to the ongoing formulation of the verification rules, and shortage of qualified Designated 
Operational Entities, today it is most common for projects to undertake verification every 12 months, 
and in many cases, it only occurs every 18 months.” See id. (emphasis added). 
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vast majority of these credits, which the data reveals they have sold to 
European and Japanese corporations. 
 
III.  THE CHINA ARGUMENT – FACT OR MYTH? 
 
The United States fears it will be compelled to purchase credits from 
China, which possesses the largest store of credits, resulting in vast sums of 
U.S. money being transferred to China.117 Motivated by the China 
argument, the United States opposes the Kyoto Protocol.118 But, does the 
United States’ China myth have any basis in fact? Or, is it the proverbial 
Loch Ness monster? 
This Article tests this hypothesis. The United States dreads entry into 
the emission market because it believes China owns the vast majority of 
credits—half the worldwide projects that generated these credits.119 This 
empirical survey demonstrates that though China has generated a vast 
number of credits, it has since alienated its stake. Indeed, China has already 
sold and no longer owns nearly 90 percent or more of its portfolio.120 As a 
result, the United States’ misgiving that it will be compelled to buy credits 
from and transfer enormous wealth to China, is plainly incorrect. 
Toward this end, Part A will provide a snapshot of the total global 
projects and China’s projects (which account for 50 percent, or more than 
2,000 projects). 
Part B will form the bulk of the analysis, and examine all the Chinese 
projects, without any exclusion or selection bias. Specifically, this study 
will examine the powers of attorney forms for all the Chinese projects to 
check how many credits does China truly own. Has China already sold 
most of its credits to foreign buyers? The raw data essentially tells the story 
– credits from nearly 90 percent of Chinese projects have been transferred 
to entities in advanced countries.121 Moreover, for 4 percent of the projects 
no power of attorney forms were filed with the Registry for us to 
authoritatively determine whether these credits were sold early or not. And 
so, the percentage of credits remaining in Chinese hands is marginal.122 
Effectively, China no longer owns the credits. Thus, if the United States 
joins the market and purchases credits on the secondary market, this money 
will flow to London, Zurich, Amsterdam or Tokyo—not Beijing.123 At this 
 
 117.  See supra Introduction, Part I.A. 
 118.  See S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted); Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1600. 
 119.  See supra Figure 3; infra Figure 4. 
 120.  See infra Figure 7. 
 121.  Id. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  See also discussion in infra note 154. 
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stage, a possible objection may have risen in the reader’s mind - If China’s 
portfolio had been acquired by European and Japanese traders, does it 
mean vast sums of cash will now flow from the United States to Europe 
and Japan? This Article examines whether the China argument that is 
impeding American support of the Kyoto Protocol is accurate. Whether 
Europe will benefit from U.S. entry into the Protocol market is beyond the 
confines of this Article. However, it is worth noticing that U.S. firms such 
as Goldman Sachs and Honeywell, as also the D.C. based World Bank have 
acquired significant carbon portfolios from China, Latin America, 
suggesting net capital outflow from the United States may be less than 
anticipated.124 Therefore, Part B will include a description of the 
methodology used to collate the data, the results as well as answer potential 
objections that may be raised regarding this study. 
 
A. China’s Share of the Global Market 
 Per UNFCCC’s data released on July 9, 2012, over 4,300 projects have 
been registered.125 Of these, as shown in Figure 4, China earned the biggest 
share of credits initially awarded, accounting for fifty percent (or more 
precisely, 50.25 percent or 2,161) of total global projects. India places a 
distant second at twenty percent.126  For uniformity and accurate analysis, 
this Article will analyze the same sample. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 124.  See sources cited supra note 28. 
 125.  CDM Statistics, UNFCCC (Aug. 9, 2012), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Registration/ 
NumOfRegisteredProjByHostPartiesPieChart.html. As per the most recent data released by the 
UNFCCC, there are 7,400 projects registered, and China continues to be the leader. See Distribution of 
Registered Projects by Host Parties, UNFCCC (Dec. 31, 2013), http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics 
/Public/CDMinsights/index.html; Trends of Projects Registered and Being Registered by Host Party, 
UNFCCC (Dec.31, 2013) http://cdm.unfccc.int/Statistics/Public/files/201312/reghpnum.pdf. In short, 
these figure reinforce and do not detract from the analysis in this Article. 
 126.  See Figure 6. 
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FIGURE 4: Worldwide Projects - Data Released on July 9, 2012127 
Total Number 4,300 
    
  
 Given that China has such a huge lead in the number of projects 
registered to date, it is unlikely that this advantage could possibly be 
diluted in a short time (or the period after July 2012). Yet it may be 
contended that this study’s cut-off date skews the analysis because China’s 
share is disproportionately high in this period (with other countries’ shares 
increasing in subsequent months). If, however, China’s market share fell in 
the period after the cut-off date, it could affect the conclusions. This is 
easily disproved. Figure 5, which represents the UNFCCC data released on 
September 28, 2012, demonstrates that there is only a negligible change in 
China’s market-share in the period from July 9 to September 28, 2012. 
Indeed, China’s share increased by .2 percent and no country’s share 
changes by even a percentage point (as documented in Figures 4 and 5). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 127.  UNFCCC, supra note 125. 
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FIGURE 5: Worldwide Projects – Data Released on Sep. 28, 2012128 
Total Number 4,690 (included an additional 390 projects registered 
between July 9 to Sep. 28, 2012) 
 
  
 This study also independently verified the UNFCCC’s numbers or 
Figures 4 and 5. Not merely relying on the charts released by the Board, 
this survey checked the full list of registered projects and confirmed the 
number of projects hosted by various countries.129 In other words, all the 
projects listed on the Registry’s website were scrutinized to vouch for the 
number of projects registered by China (and other nations). Figure 6 was 
prepared using projects registered until August 31, 2012 and supports the 
finding that there is scarcely any change in China’s total market share. 
 This study further breaks down the country data to include nations that 
contribute as little as 1 percent. A complete list of countries and the number 
of projects each country has registered has been included in Figures 6A and 
Appendix 1. In contrast, the Board’s data (Figures 4 and 5) identifies the 
six nations earning the most credits, and combines all other nations under 
the generic category “others.” A further analysis of whether smaller 
countries also display sales pattern similar to China shall be left for future 
work. 
 
 
 128.  UNFCCC, supra note 125.. 
 129.  Special thanks to Jonathan Waisnor for diligently checking and profiling this data. 
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Vietnam  2.91%  143 
Rest of Asia**  2.77%  136 
Malaysia  2.44%  120 
Rest of Africa**  2.04%  100 
Rest of North and Central 
America**  1.79%  88 
Indonesia  1.69%  83 
Thailand 1.65% 81 
Republic of Korea 1.55% 76 
Chile 1.26% 62 
Philippines 1.24% 61 
Rest of Europe** 0.29% 14 
Rest of Oceania** 0.16% 8 
** Percentage of the total number of projects, 4,908. 
* See Appendix 1 for the complete list of countries combined together as   
“Rest” of South America, Asia, Africa in Figure 6A. 
 
 The following Part B will study the documents registered in relation to 
Chinese projects, which account for the majority of global projects. There 
will be no internal selection—the entire China portfolio will be examined. 
Specifically, the powers of attorney submitted for all 2,000+ Chinese 
projects were checked, to determine the percentage of projects China 
continues to own. If any other nation(s) buys and now owns a significant 
portion of the credits that China initially earned, ipso facto, that country 
(and not China) will receive U.S. money, if the U.S. accedes to the Kyoto 
Protocol. Our analysis in the following Part B, thus, goes to the heart of 
U.S. consternation and cold feet with regard to a binding emissions treaty. 
 
B. Who Owns China’s Credits? 
 Globally, China has earned the most number of carbon credits initially 
awarded as discussed in detail in Part A. However, an overwhelming 
majority of Chinese projects owners sold their credits to corporations in 
advanced nations. Corporations based outside China have acquired credits 
from 90 percent of the Chinese projects; in fact, the Board’s records reveal 
that most Chinese corporations transferred the credits very early on in their 
project cycles, even before credits were issued.131 These advanced nation 
 
 131.  See infra Figure 7. Note, power of attorney forms must be submitted to the Board only if the 
Chinese owner sells the credits before they are generated or issued. In the case of China, as shown in 
infra Figure 7, for a vast majority (close to 90 percent), the forms were filed by owners; ipso facto 
demonstrating the credits were sold before the Registry issued certificates. For a discussion on owners 
registering the carbon component of the project even before the main plant is constructed, and traders’ 
observations that Chinese owners sell their credits early, see supra Part II.C.2. 
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buyers own title to these credits and if any subsequent sales occur, 
payments will flow to these corporations and not into China. Similarly, if 
as a result of the United States’ opposition to the Kyoto Protocol, the cap 
and trade market loses steam, traders in the industrialized world rather than 
Chinese industry will suffer loss. 
 Part B.1. will outline the methodology, and Part B.2. will explain the 
results of this study. One possible criticism of the methodology and results 
in Part B.2. could be that this study focuses solely on powers of attorney. 
For instance, it may be pointed out, in addition to powers of attorney 
holders, the Registry also records “project participants.” Project 
participants are parties and nations that may have an ownership stake in the 
credits, albeit in lesser quantities. On that basis, the following counter-
argument may arise: What if an analysis of project participants reveals 
different results and the vast majority are Chinese entities? Part B.3. 
preempts this potential objection and studies the project participants data-
point. The project participants’ data corroborate and further strengthen the 
conclusion that China sold its credits. Part B.3. provides a method to 
double-check the empirical results in Part B.2., and Part B.4. answers other 
potential objections that may be leveled against the survey. 
 
1. Methodology. The following methodology was employed to 
calculate and deduce the empirical results. First, this study utilized the 
same sample as the Board, which showed approximately 2,100 projects 
were registered before July 2012 (see Figure 4). This survey included 2,168 
projects, 7 more than the 2,161 projects in the Board’s release.132 Second, 
the powers of attorney for all the 2,161 projects are included in the study. 
Third, this investigation focuses on the power to instruct the Board to 
transfer the credits. As per carbon rules, the Board has a specific power of 
attorney form with regard to credits,133 which allows for three different 
powers to be transferred.134 The most important power involves “the 
authority to instruct the secretariat and communicate with the Clean 
Development Mechanism’s Executive Board on the allocation and 
forwarding of CERs.”135 This provision is easily the critical one, a signal of 
 
 132.  This study utilizes July 7, 2012 rather than July 9, 2012. At a quick glance, it may appear 
strange that this survey yields a greater number of projects registered by July 7 than the number 
released by the Board on July 9, 2012. However, the data in Figure 4 was released on July 7; this is not 
the cut-off date for the Board’s numbers. This explains why Figure 7 presents 2,168 Chinese projects 
whereas Figure 4 reflects 2,161 Chinese projects. 
 133.  See CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98 
  134.  See supra note 100 for discussion on the three types of powers that can be transferred through 
the carbon market’s power of attorney form. 
 135.  This is the text found in the majority of forms reviewed in this study. However, the Board 
periodically modifies the form. For most recent language (with minor amendment in text) approved by 
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ownership or title transfer, and so, the review focuses on this entry. To 
avoid confusing transfers of title and ownership interests tracked in this 
study with less relevant powers such as to merely be copied on 
communication, this examination excludes the latter.136 For instance, 
contractors assisting the firm with developing its carbon project may be 
copied on communication. In which case, the project owner will include an 
entry in the form (to the Board) specifying the name and details of any 
other firm (other than the owner) who ought to be copied on 
communication. This permission is significantly different from ownership 
and the power to transfer credits. This review excludes these ancillary 
permissions included in the form to avoid muddling the primary 
conclusion. In short, eliminating other entries in the form, which are not 
clear indicators of ownership, ensures the survey is more accurate. 
 Fourth, the form allows for the power of attorney to be “sole,”137 
“shared”138 or “joint,”139 and the survey employs the following 
methodology:140 When a buyer had the sole right to provide instructions, it 
was assigned a 1. When a buyer had joint or shared rights with another 
buyer, each buyer was assigned a .50. The vast majority of the forms 
granted either “sole” or “joint” right to instruct the Board regarding the 
transfer of credits.141 
 
the Board see supra note 100.  See also CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98 for the Board’s 
official template. The Modalities of Communication is the approved form issued by the Board. In this 
form, participants indicate whether that focal point(s) has sole (or shared) delegated authority with 
respect to the distribution and forwarding of CERs. Interview with Paul Curnow, supra note 101.  
 136.  The excluded provisions are: “(i) authority to add, delete or withdraw Project Participants,” 
and “(iii) communication, and to be copied on communication with the Board (and secretariat).” See 
also CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98. 
 137.  “Sole Focal Point authority - A signature of an authorised signatory of ONLY the entity 
listed below is required for communication related to the corresponding scope of authority.” CDM 
REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98, at 1. Section II. Annex I parties (advanced nations) buying credits 
from China typically insist sellers authorize buyers as the sole Focal Point.  Occasionally, Chinese 
sellers insist on being joint focal point, in which case the buyers include clauses insisting the seller will 
agree to sign any request for distribution of credits as submitted the buyer. See Interview with Paul 
Curnow, supra note 101. 
 138.  “Shared Focal Point authority - A signature of an authorised signatory of ANY of the 
entities listed below is required for communication related to the corresponding scope of authority.” 
CDM REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note 98, at 1. 
 139.  “Joint Focal Point authority - A signature of an authorised signatory of ALL entities listed 
below are required for communication related to the corresponding scope of authority.” Id. 
 140.  There has been no known litigation or public dispute with regard to these forms, such as how 
the Board would interpret notice rules for receiving instructions (in case more than one party claims the 
credits through two parties named in the original power of attorney). And so, this Article will not 
speculate on possible disputes and outcomes that have not arisen in the real world. 
 141.  For complete list of the corporate groups and entities in whose favor the powers of attorney 
are drawn, whether sole, shared or joint, see infra Appendix 2. 
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 Fifth, if parties submitted revised forms, the study included the most 
recent ones. For instance, Chinese Seller A sold the credits to Carbon 
Trader B, who subsequently sold them to Investment Bank C. If the sale 
occurs early, before credits are issued, then Bank C will ask Seller A to file 
a revised power of attorney in favor of Bank C. In this case, this study 
would have identified Bank C as the buyer. However, if Carbon Trader B 
sold the credits to Investment Bank C after the credits were issued (and in 
Trader B’s account), Trader B would merely transfer the credits to Bank 
C’s account. In these circumstances, neither Seller A nor Trader B would 
have filed a revised power of attorney form in favor of Bank C. The sale to 
Bank C will not be recorded by this study. In short, this examination 
excludes secondary market sales that are not verifiable through Registry 
records.142 
 This secondary market exclusion is noteworthy, for the following 
reason: for 243 projects, there was no power of attorney on record or the 
form only mentioned the original Chinese entity’s name.143 These are 
classified separately as “No Power of Attorney” on record.144 Similarly, the 
projects that only named the Chinese firm in the form were retained in the 
“China” column.145 Plausibly, these projects (where no powers of attorney 
were filed, or named only the Chinese project developer) may have been 
subsequently sold to foreign buyers.146 This is especially likely, since 
Chinese corporations prefer to sell the credits early rather than hoard them 
hoping that prices will rise in future.147 Erring on the side of caution, this 
review retains these projects in the China column. Thus, traders in Europe 
and elsewhere may own more of the China credits than this study 
suggests.148 In short, the evidence does not support the China argument that 
if the United States ratifies the Kyoto Protocol, enormous U.S. wealth will 
flow into Beijing. To the contrary, the numbers suggest the China argument 
may be a myth. 
 
 
 
 142.  The vast majority of projects in this study utilize older versions of the Modalities of 
Communication form, which do not record secondary sales. However, in future, it may be possible to 
track secondary market sales because the more recent form provides a column for this data. See CDM 
REGISTRY, UNFCCC, supra note98, at 2 (“Use this Section for Post-Registration Submissions Only”). 
 143.  No powers of attorney forms are available for 101 projects, and the forms for 142 projects 
only name the original Chinese project owner. See infra Figure 7. Details on these 243 projects are 
available in the Excel file compiled (on file with author and available on request). 
 144.  Complete data compiled in Excel format (on file with author and available on request). 
 145.  Id. 
 146.  The form also allows the Chinese project developer to nominate an employee or subsidiary. In 
the case of such entries, they are retained in the “China” column. See infra Figure 7. 
 147.  Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101. 
 148.  See infra Figure 7. 
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2. The Results. The raw data tells the story. The power of attorney 
forms are frequently filed with the Registry, as early as at the start of the 
accreditation cycle, and reveal striking results. Close to 90 percent of the 
2,168 Chinese projects in that period include a power of attorney in favor 
of international buyers.149 
 One-hundred and one projects (or 4.66 percent of Chinese projects) do 
not include a power of attorney.150 The forms for 142 projects (or 6.55 
percent approximately) name only Chinese developers or original 
owners.151 The vast majority, 1,925 projects, include forms conferring non-
Chinese corporations (or buyers) with the right to instruct the Board to 
transfer the credits generated.152 
 Analyzing who held the powers of attorney for these credits yields 
illuminating results. Over 158 corporate groups are involved and together 
hold the powers of attorney for 1,925 projects.153 Of these, a vast majority 
of buyers own only a few projects; for example, several buyers own only 
10–20 projects.154 In fact, only 9 buyers own fifty or more projects, and 
these buyers are included in Figure 7.155 These 9 buyers account for 822.5 
projects.156 The rest own less than 50 projects each, and are combined 
under “Other Buyers.” The Other Buyers account for 1102 projects, or 50 
percent of China’s portfolio.  
 The specific corporate groups that own a significant stake are as 
follows. The Sweden based Carbon Asset Management, is the single largest 
buyer and owns approximately 148 projects or 6.85 percent.157 The Geneva 
 
 149.  Complete data compiled in Excel format (on file with author and available on request). 
 150.  See infra Figure 7. 
 151.  Id. 
 152.  Id. 
 153.  See infra Table 1, Appendix 2 for the list of over 158 buyers. Of these 158 buyers, over 40 
corporate groups buy projects through multiple subsidiaries or related entities. For the list of the related 
entities that are combined to generate Table 1 and Figure 7, see Table 2, Appendix 2. See also 
explanation infra note 155. 
 154.  See infra app. 2, tbl.1. 
 155.  Generally, the buyers are listed as they are named in the original forms, with one exception 
(described below). Several buyers (Camco, for instance) prefer to own credits utilizing more than one of 
its entities or subsidiaries. In other words, one firm through multiple subsidiaries may own credits from 
one project. Similarly, a buyer operating through its parent company and related entities purchases 
credits from different projects. Hence, this study combines select entities to more accurately represent 
who owns the credits. For better analysis, only entities that are prima facie or obviously closely related 
entities are aggregated. No additional sleuthing to discover precise shareholder patterns etc. is 
undertaken. For the list of the entities that are combined, see Table 2, Appendix 2. As a result, several 
buyers (Camco, for instance) end up with over 50 projects. This review adds up the powers of attorney 
held by several Camco companies in order to arrive at the Group’s figures. 
 156.  See infra Figure 7. 
 157.  The final results yield figures in decimal point (or fractions) because of the methodology 
followed to allocate projects involving multiple buyers. See supra Part III.B.1 (Methodology). 
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based Carbon Resource Management, having purchased around 126 
projects or 5.812 percent, cinches the second place.158 U.K. based 
corporations EcoSecurities and RWE come in third and fourth respectively, 
with 118 projects or 5.44 percent and 99 projects or 4.56 percent.159 
Switzerland’s Vitol S.A., United States’ EDF Trading, and Japan’s 
Mitsubishi are the other large buyers who possess the powers of attorney 
for more than fifty projects.160 
 As discussed earlier, even the 11 percent (or 253 of the total 2,168 
projects) where owners did not file any power of attorney form (or where 
the form names only the Chinese owner) may have been subsequently 
sold.161 Whether or not these credits are still with China cannot be verified 
through publicly available data.162 The study merely indicates the owners 
either did not file a power of attorney, or listed only a Chinese corporation. 
Assuming arguendo, China still owns these credits, this does little to dilute 
the findings—China liquidated vast majority of its credits, and mostly non-
Chinese firms based in industrialized nations bought these credits. So, this 
Article will err on the side of the caution and leave the 153 projects for 
which no forms were filed, under the China account. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 158.  See infra app. 2, tbl.1. Carbon Asset Management has since become a wholly owned 
subsidiary of Vitol S.A., increasing Vitol’s carbon portfolio. To keep it simple, and since it is 
unnecessary for the central thesis of disputing the China argument, this Article will not unnecessarily 
meander into identifying which parent corporation may own what percentage of credits indirectly. This 
study uses the entity named in the documents submitted to the Registry. 
 159.  Id. 
 160.  See infra Figure 7. 
 161.  The International Carbon Trader, supra note 101, stated, Chinese entities prefer to sell credits 
rather than wait for possible higher prices in future. Hence, he surmised, it is highly likely that even the 
credits ostensibly in the China column – for which no forms were available, were sold to foreign buyers 
after the project was registered, or credits issued. For further discussion, see supra Part III.B.1. 
 162.  The Registry only requires the owner to file these forms, and keep these records when credits 
are sold at early stages of the project, before the certificates are issued. If any owner sells them after the 
Board has credited the certificates (into the owner’s account), the owners do not have to file any forms 
with the Registry. Hence, later sales cannot be tracked or calculated with certainty. See supra Part 
III.B.1. 
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second empirical study that tests for and eliminates the possibility that 
Chinese buyers are involved, albeit purchasing smaller stakes. 
 
3. A Second Test. In addition to powers of attorney, the Registry 
provides a second method to verify whether the conclusion that China has 
sold its portfolio to international buyers is indeed accurate. The Registry 
also maintains records on “project participants,” or countries that are 
participating in a particular project.163 For example, the Chinese project 
owner names several entities as “project participants,” who have the right 
to be copied on all communication from the Board.164 It is standard 
business practice for various buyers to be listed as participants, and the 
owner can nominate one or more of the participant firms as the holder of 
the power of attorney to transfer credits, as explained earlier.165 There is a 
possibility, however small, that the Chinese owner provides a power of 
attorney to an international buyer but all other buyers are Chinese entities. 
 
 163.  The information is listed under the “Other Parties” column, Project Activities Submitted for 
Registration, PROJECT CYCLE SEARCH, UNFCC, http http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/request_reg.html 
(last visited Dec. 28, 2013). 
 164.  Project Participants, BAKER & MCKENZIE, http://cdmrulebook.org/69 (last visited Dec. 28, 
2013) (“Project participant is defined in the CDM Glossary of Terms as follows: [A] project participant 
is (a) a Party involved, which has indicated to be a project participant, or (b) a private and/or public 
entity authorized by a Party involved to participate in a CDM project activity (CDM Glossary of Terms, 
Version 03). An entity can become a project participant before or after registration of a CDM project, 
but must always have a letter of approval from a Kyoto Protocol Party before it can do so and 
subsequently receive CERs from that project. Receipt of CERs by way of a secondary transfer 
represents an exception to this.”). See also id (Rights of Project Participants). As a carbon expert 
explains: “Project Participants are the private or public entities that each Annex I party [advanced 
nation] and the host country authorize to participate in and undertake the project. Annex I parties decide 
which private or public entity are allowed to participate in the Kyoto Protocol market (the rules are left 
up to each Annex I party); whereas the host country decides on whether the seller may participate in the 
market, and whether the project meets the sustainable development requirements of that host country. 
These approvals are entirely separate from the internal arrangements the firms may put in place with 
respect to communicating with the Board regarding with credits.  Under the Kyoto Protocol rules, 
project participants must agree on who will act as focal point(s) for the project and what delegated 
authority the focal point (s) would have in respect of the distribution of CERs (into relevant accounts of 
participants once credits are issued).  Under the market rules, only participants can receive credits 
directly from the Registry into their account; this is why Buyers insist on not only being the focal point 
but also participant so that they can receive the credits directly into their accounts.” Interview with Paul 
Curnow, supra note 101. 
 165.  For instance, in the case of Project 0011: Project for GHG Emission Reduction by Thermal 
Oxidation of HFC23 in Jiangsu Meilan Chemical CO. Ltd., Jiangsu Province, China, a slew of 
corporations from Japan, Spain, Italy, Denmark, Netherlands, Canada (subsequently withdrawn), U.K., 
Finland, Norway, Germany, Switzerland, France, and Sweden were involved and most were listed on 
the form as to be copied on communications. But the project owner provided the sole right  to transfer 
credits to the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. See  Project 0011: Project for 
GHG Emission Reduction by Thermal Oxidation of HFC23 in Jiangsu Meilan Chemical CO. Ltd., 
Jiangsu Province, China, UNFCCC, available at https://cdm.unfccc. 
int/Projects/DB/JQA1144312006.34/view (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). 
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If this is commonly occurring, then China continues to own significant 
number of credits, which could negate the results of Part B.2., showing that 
China alienated its credits. Thus, this Part B.3. will examine the project 
participants’ data to verify whether the conclusion in Part B.2. is accurate. 
The Registry data on project participants provides one additional 
advantage—it names and lists the countries that are involved which allows 
us to discern whether China owns more credits than estimated in Part B.2. 
 The following methodology is employed to examine the country 
participant data. As with the power of attorney analysis, this survey 
includes all the Chinese projects, eliminating any objection of selection 
bias. Next, for each of the 2,227 projects, all the participants are included in 
the study.166 The project participants’ data has one advantage over the 
powers of attorney data – it lists the country corresponding to each 
corporation. Hence, it helps us accurately measure which countries own 
and are participating in China’s carbon credit projects. 
 Though the power of attorney is generally drawn in favor of one party, 
the number of project participants is typically higher - typically three (or 
more) parties, which frequently include participants from different 
countries. In many transactions, two or more buyers create a joint venture 
or other business arrangement and act together to buy the credits earned 
from a single project.167 
 When projects involved more than one buyer, the participation was 
weighted so that each participating buyer was assigned an equal share in 
the project they are involved in. If the form listed only one buyer, that 
buyer received full credit (or was assigned “one”). For projects with 
multiple buyers, the share (or the number one) was divided between the 
buyers.168 For example, if Switzerland, the Netherlands, and the United 
Kingdom bought credits from the same project, each participant is assigned 
a share of .334. The shares of the buyers from one country are then added 
up to create a country’s total weighted participation average. 
 One possible objection to this study could be that it provides equal 
weight to all countries, whereas a nation could have bought more or less 
shares than others. For instance, three buyers from the United Kingdom, 
Netherlands, and Switzerland respectively buy credits from one project. Let 
us assume arguendo that the U.K. entity acquires a majority of the credits, 
 
 166.   For instance, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Switzerland are 
listed as project participants for Nanjing Tianjingwa Landfill Gas to Electricity Project. See Project 
0071: Nanjing Tianjingwa Landfill Gas to Electricity Project, PROJECT CYCLE SEARCH, UNFCCC, 
http://cdm.unfccc.int/Projects/DB/DNV-CUK1129289693.13/view (last visited Dec. 28, 2013). Figures 
8 and 9, infra, are created by extracting the data for all the Chinese projects. The complete data as 
collated and compiled in Excel format is on file with the author (and available on request). 
 167.  For an illustration, see infra note 172. 
 168.  Id. 
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and the Swiss and Dutch corporations buy smaller shares. In this case, the 
United Kingdom’s quantitative participation would be higher than the .334 
that is assigned as per the survey’s methodology.169 
 This objection can be easily set aside for the following reasons. First, 
the initial study tracking powers of attorney already examines and 
measures senior buyers.170 In contrast, the second study measuring 
participants is intended solely to corroborate the earlier finding that China 
sold its portfolio to international firms. Second, this Article demonstrates 
that China has alienated its gargantuan credit stockpile and so a possible 
U.S. entry into the emissions market will not provide as much gain to 
China as the conventional wisdom suggests. The number of shares the 
United Kingdom buys relative to Switzerland is beyond the scope of this 
Article. Third, sharing arrangements between private buyers cannot be 
conclusively tracked through public records. Since any estimates of such 
private arrangements would be speculative, it is not included here. This 
Article seeks to test the veracity of the China argument, and so, restraining 
from speculating on each buyer’s precise share does not affect the 
conclusions of this study.  
 Lastly, the following feature is worth noticing before the reader turns to 
the empirical results. There is little possibility that an entity named in this 
form may be a hired service provider: Owners would not be willing to 
authorize contractors with the power to communicate with regulators, such 
as the Board. And so, the owners are unlikely to include, as a participant, a 
contractor who merely provides carbon development services (for example, 
in developing the registration documents).171 Thus, the possibility that an 
entity named in this form may be a hired service provider is easily 
disproved. 
 The results of this study corroborate the power of attorney study and 
further strengthen the conclusions. As shown in Figure 8 below, the United 
Kingdom is the single largest buyer, picking up 742.43 projects or 36 
percent of Chinese projects.172 Switzerland cinches the second place, and 
 
 169.  In this example, according to carbon market rules, the Swiss and U.K. buyers’ permission 
would be required to transfer any of the credits. In practice, it is unlikely that lawyers or owners of a 
larger chunk of the shares would agree to confer a minor buyer with the power to block or refuse to 
transfer credits. So this possibility can be eliminated. 
 170.  See supra Part III.B.1–2. 
 171.  See MIRIAM HINOSTROZA, UNEP RISØE CENTER, CDM PDD GUIDEBOOK: NAVIGATING THE 
PITFALLS 28 (3d ed. 2011), available at http://cd4cdm.org/Publications/PDDguidebook_3rdEdition.pdf 
(“Pitfall 2: Project participants not clearly identified . . . . Typically, consultants, DNAs and local 
municipalities do not have a share in the distribution of CERs.”).  The owner will be conferring 
significant powers to parties named in the form, and absent transfer in ownership, corporations do not 
nominate unrelated third parties lightly. 
 172.  The final results for number of projects sometimes involve decimal points (or fractions) 
because multiple buyers frequently purchase credits from one project, and so, the project share is 
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purchases 14 percent or 302.79 projects. Japanese buyers are third in line, 
and account for 12 percent or 276.78 projects. Netherlands and Sweden 
also own substantial portions of Chinese projects, accounting for 12 percent 
and 9 percent, respectively. The following European nations are the other 
significant purchasers – Germany (4 percent), Austria and France (2 
percent each), and Spain, Italy, Norway and Finland (1 percent each). 
“Others” in Figure 8 includes some countries that own credits from a few 
projects. If we utilize this project participant study (rather than the right to 
transfer the credits we measured in Part B.2.) to determine what percentage 
of credits China owns, then by this measure China has sold over 96 percent 
of its projects. 
 Less than 4 percent (84 projects) do not list other countries as 
participants in the projects carried out in China.173 As discussed earlier, this 
does not prove that these credits are still with China, or that they were not 
sold subsequently.174 Similar to the first study measuring powers of 
attorney, when no public records are available, the second study on project 
participants’ data also retains these projects in the ‘China’ column. The 
second study shows that China liquidated its holdings and that traders in 
industrialized nations now own the credits, corroborating the first empirical 
study which relies on power of attorney holders data. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
divided between these buyers (to accurately represent the facts, and to avoid double counting). For a 
discussion of the methodology, see supra Part III.A. 
 173.  See infra Figure 8. 
 174.  For an explanation of the methodology utilized when no powers of attorney exist, see supra 
Part III.A.1. 
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FIGURE 8: International Participants Listed for Chinese Projects 
2,227 Projects Registered until July 9, 2012175 
** Others include Norway (21.61), Denmark (12.80), Canada (1.61), 
Portugal (6.33), Belgium (4.22), Luxembourg (1.22), Australia (3.5), 
Liechtenstein (1), and Ireland (.75). 
 
 One possible objection to this study could be that it counts the number 
of projects, rather than the number of credits. In other words, what if China 
sold its small projects but retains the projects that generate more credits? 
China does not list any other participant for 84 projects (or 4 percent of the 
total projects). Does this mean China continues to own a significant 
number of credits (albeit through a smaller number of projects)? To 
account for this possibility, an additional study was made measuring the 
number of credits (rather than number of projects) that the international 
buyers have bought.176 
 As Figure 9, reveals, calculating the number of credits rather than 
projects reduces China’s share even further, and only marginally changes 
 
 175.  Figure 8 is generated utilizing all the Chinese projects registered as of July 9, 2012, which 
amount to 2,227 projects. By contrast, Figure 4 is generated utilizing data the UNFCCC released on 
July 9, 2012, which lists 2,161 as the total number of projects from China. The UNFCCC chart may 
have been released on July 9, 2012 but prepared earlier. This explains the difference in the total 
number of Chinese projects. In any event, including a few additional projects does not adversely impact 
the results. Further, the number of projects is in decimals because when multiple buyers are included, 
projects are divided between them as explained in supra note 172. 
 176.  See infra Figure 9. 
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the shares of individual nations (or buyers).177 Simply put, the numbers do 
not support the possibility that China engages in strategic behavior, selling 
its small projects while retaining the largest ones to obtain vast sums from 
the United States, if the United States chooses to enter the market. 
 
FIGURE 9: Measuring the Number of Credits 
 
 
4. Response to Possible Objections. There may be two other objections 
to this data. A first objection may be that the studies in this Article only 
track “first” or initial sales and not any subsequent ones. Hence, one can 
argue, the U.K. traders could have subsequently sold a large number of the 
credits they bought and thus if the United States enters the market and buys 
credits, the revenues may flow to another country and not to London. 
Conceivably, this scenario may be true, but this objection does not affect 
the central argument of this Article. With regard to this “subsequent sales” 
objection, the fact still remains that China has sold its credits, putting to 
rest U.S. fears that enormous cash will flow from America to China if the 
United States signs the Kyoto Protocol. 
 With regard to the powers of attorney study, one objection could be as 
follows. A buyer may buy only a portion of the total credits emanating 
from a project – either a fixed number or percentage, and the Chinese 
producer may have retained a sizeable amount. This possibility can be 
 
 177.  The methodology used to tabulate the data and generate Figure 9 is as follows. The Registry 
provides an estimate of credits expected from each project. Each country is assigned an equal share of 
the credits from each project, and then each country’s number of credits from all its projects are added 
up to generate a nation’s total number of credit purchases. 
Retained by China -2%
9687728 Credits
Others - 4%
15031042.74 Credits
Austria - 2% 
6439281.493 Credits 
Canada - 2%
7205585.017 Credits 
UK - 33%
139491942.6 Credits
Switzerland - 16%
65699332.45 Credits
Japan - 14%
58675184.35 Credits
Netherlands - 11%
43555873.6 Credits
Sweden - 6%
22954414.02 Credits
Germany - 3%
13920596.18 Credits
Spain - 2%
7343478.198 Credits
Italy - 3%
10773023.61 Credits
France - 2%
10162666.69 Credits Retained by China
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Switzerland
Japan
Netherlands
Sweden
Germany
Italy
France
Spain
Canada
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Others
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easily set-aside. First, it is highly unlikely that a firm would be willing to 
grant another firm the complete right to transfer all credits, if the buyer is 
only acquiring a small percentage of the credits.178 Second, this scenario is 
even more improbable given the economics of developing a carbon 
project:179 Developing a carbon project involves significant transaction 
costs, including (a) the costs of preparing and filing the registration 
documents, and (b) agencies’ fees for various services.180 These costs are 
frequently borne by buyers (if they purchase credits prior to registration), 
and so, buyers are unwilling to incur these costs if they gain only a small 
percentage of credits from a project, as confirmed by the Carbon Trader.181 
 Moreover, well-placed carbon traders confirm that Chinese producers 
choose to enter into, and sell their credits early, (rather than storing the 
credits expecting prices to rise in future).182 Moreover, a leading carbon 
 
 178.  As per the carbon market rules, owners have the option of choosing to provide buyers with a 
full (“sole”) right to transfer the credit or share it with other entities. See the discussion on “sole,” 
“shared,” and “joint” power of attorney in supra notes141–143 and accompanying text. 
 179.  Carbon service firms (preparing forms) increasingly prefer to be paid in credits. They prefer 
to buy all or most of the credits at a lower rate rather than earn a small consultancy fee. Hence, the 
possibility that firms named as participants or holding powers of attorney provide only services (with no 
ownership stake in the credits) can be refuted. Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101. 
 180.  Developing a carbon project involves the following costs: (a) Agencies’ charges - For 
instance, agencies’ fees increase if the parties opt for more frequent verification; (b) Board’s 
registration and issuance fees - This approximately ranges around 0.10 – 0.20 USD per tonne of CO2 for 
registration, and similar fees are charged every time credits were issued; (c) Adaptation fee - 2 percent 
of credits are retained by the Board to assist nations that are threatened by climate change 
consequences; (d) Costs of preparing PDD and other document required for registration. Kyoto 
Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 12 para. 8; Background Paper of the UNFCCC Workshop on the 
Adaptation Fund on Share of Proceeds to Assist in Meeting the Costs of Adaptation, at 1–3 (May 3–5, 
2006), available at 
http://unfccc.int/files/cooperation_and_support/financial_mechanism/financial_mechanism_gef/applicat
ion/pdf/adaptation_sop.pdf. See also McNish, supra note 17, at 413 (providing a detailed description of 
the various transaction costs involved in obtaining credits). 
 181.  Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101. 
 182.  Id. As a carbon expert explained: “Certainly the market in China for CDM projects is very 
different from the approach taken by Indian sellers. In India, sellers tend to favor a unilateral approach, 
i.e. developing the CDM project themselves - often without the certainty of a forward contract with an 
Annex I Buyer - and then only looking to enter into spot sales once the projects were registered and 
starting to generate credits. China displays the opposite practice. Indeed, the Chinese government policy 
does not allow unilateral carbon projects (even though the international rules did allow it): the National 
Development and Reform Commission (NDRC) - which is the Designated National Authority for China 
- required Chinese sellers to show they have a willing Annex I Buyer and a contract in place for the sale 
of the credits (and it would only be a few years later that China introduced the additional floor price 
requirement into the approval process).  Given China’s position on unilateral CDM, Chinese sellers 
have to enter into forward sales with Annex I Buyers in order to take advantage of the CDM. It is 
market practice in China - and indeed required by the NDRC - to sell 100% of the credits to the Annex I 
Buyer - except where a percentage might go to a project consultant or advisor (who in turn typically 
sells forward rather than seeking to hold on to them).  Sellers do not retain any percentage for later sale 
into the market (unlike the market practice of many Indian sellers).” Interview with Paul Curnow, supra 
note 101. 
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trader also explains that generally, only buyers and not consultants were 
granted the power of attorney(s) forms deposited before the Board.183 
Indeed, as the carbon trader explained the possibility that if any industry 
owner is determined to retain the credits, perhaps with the intent to sell 
them directly after the credits are issued, owners have the option to engage 
carbon firms as consultants and pay them a fee (rather than agree to sell the 
credits forward).184 If a Chinese producer hires a carbon consultant and opts 
to develop the credits for their own account, it is unnecessary to issue a 
power of attorney in favor of the consultant for the purpose of merely 
developing the project, which makes it unlikely that this practice is 
widespread.185 
 A third potential objection may be that the data is “static.” What if 
China registers new projects and earns additional credits rapidly as soon as 
the United States ratifies the Protocol? In that event, China could still be a 
huge beneficiary of U.S. wealth, plausibly negating this survey. This 
potential critique can be easily rebutted. As per carbon rules, China cannot 
register past activities and so, cannot easily flood the market.186 
Furthermore, there is a significant interval of time between registration (or 
starting the process to earn credits) and when credits are actually earned (or 
issued). Either way, the market cannot be flooded overnight. Importantly, it 
is not in China’s interest to increase supply drastically when the demand 
for credits is fixed (as per the Kyoto Protocol’s targets), because that will 
reduce the price.187 Moreover, the arithmetic does not support this 
possibility, because the vast majority of China’s credits are not “retired” or 
already used to set-off past targets.188 Instead, they have been bought by 
traders with the intention of subsequently selling them.189 Hence, the 
United States has the option to purchase credits from a large number of 
trading firms in advanced nations, as well as the other developing nations, 
which totals up to 95 percent of the credits issued until now.190 
 In short, these potential objections may be easily overcome. The 
empirical results clearly show: China sold a hefty portion of its credits and 
so, any future earnings will be retained by these trading firms. Thus, the 
 
 183.  Interview with Carbon Trader, supra note 101. 
 184.  Id. 
 185.  See supra notes 137–139. 
 186.  Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, at art. 12 para. 5(c). 
 187.  For a discussion on the fixed targets provided for advanced countries by the Kyoto Protocol, 
see supra Part II. 
 188.  I am grateful to Liz Sheargold for pointing this out. 
 189.  See supra Figure 7. 
 190.  See supra Figure 4 (showing that India, Brazil and other developing nations owned nearly 50 
percent of the credits issued until now); supra Figure 7 (showing most of China’s projects have been 
bought by carbon traders). 
Anand - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/17/2014  10:21 AM 
48 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:1 
findings in this study prove, it is highly implausible that enormous U.S. 
wealth will be transferred to China through emissions trading. This Article, 
thus, removes the biggest stumbling block that stymies U.S. legal 
scholarship and policy on climate change.191 In addition to the China 
argument, the existing scholarship raises a few other analytical arguments 
against U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol, which shall be discussed 
in the following Part. 
 
IV.  THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
  
 American climate change literature to date focuses on China, and the 
“China myth” sharply influences the United States’ response to the global 
emissions debate. Indeed, Posner and Sunstein argue, so long as China’s 
emissions are not capped, the United States could not be held responsible 
for climate change under either a corrective or distributive justice theory.192 
Dan Farber responds to Posner and Sunstein’s argument with a moral 
theory—the United States is “morally” responsible for its emissions, 
independent of Chinese liability.193 Both sets of scholars base their theory 
and conclusions on the premise (or fear) that U.S. wealth will flow to China 
if an international emissions treaty is ratified. Indeed, this Article is the first 
to check whether market facts support this presumption about China; in 
fact, the evidence unearthed by this study shows the presumption is false, 
and thus arrests the “China myth.” 
 In addition to the “China myth,” 
justice theorists point to a few theoretical reasons to argue the United States 
is not obligated to ratify the Kyoto Protocol. In support, they argue that the 
present regime does not fulfill the conditions of either corrective or 
distributive justice theory.194 This Part will show the gaps in the theoretical 
objections that justice theorists put forward. 
 Scholars such as Posner and Sunstein declare the climate claim falls 
short of justice standards because it does not fit into one of the following 
boxes: pure corrective justice or distributive justice.195 In the process, 
caricatured versions of the climate claim are presented. For instance, 
Posner and Sunstein present the corrective justice claim as punishing the 
“United States for its wealth,” because the nations most at risk were 
 
 191.  See sources cited supra note 3 for the legal scholars who have been seeking to formulate a 
cogent theory for U.S. participation in the Kyoto Protocol but were stymied by the China argument. See 
also sources cited supra notes 41, 44 (showing how the Senate has resisted ratifying and passing 
emission regulations because of the China argument). 
 192.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1611–12. 
 193.  Farber, supra note 5, at 379; Farber, supra note 3, at 17. 
 194.  See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1611–12. 
 195.  Id. 
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poor.196 Similarly, they state, the grounds for distributive justice grounds 
are not fulfilled because emission funds are a “crude means of 
producing . . . redistribution . . . .”197 But the climate claim is different from 
this wealth redistribution theorem. The greenhouse gases that the United 
States emits form the crux of the claim, not its wealth.198 
 Furthermore, the climate claim rests not only on past emissions but also 
the tonnes of greenhouse gases that the United States continues to emit at 
present and in the foreseeable future.199 Posner and Sunstein, however, 
ignore present and continuing emissions entirely.200 Instead, they declare, 
the United States is being held liable solely because of its past emissions or 
“wrongful behavior that occurred in the past,” (or the corrective justice 
rationale).201 This argument misrepresents the climate claim as wholly 
“backward-looking” punishment for past behavior, even though the claim 
includes both past and present emissions.202 Interestingly, Posner and 
Sunstein conclude, the climate justice argument fails to meet the conditions 
necessary to successfully obtain compensation in a tort suit in the United 
States, and so, the corrective justice claim is dissolved.203 Corrective justice 
may be the philosophy informing tort law204 but that does not mean the 
 
 196.  Id. at 1565. 
 197.  Id. 
 198.  In short, the United States is not being targeted or punished for its wealth as the Posner and 
Sunstein theorem declares, but because its industrial activities led to the effluents. Other industrialized 
nations such as Europe have assumed responsibility based upon this principle.  The United States 
remains the only major industrialized nation refusing to accept the international accord, an aspect often 
under-emphasized in standard accounts. See Farber, supra note 5, at 398 (“The United States 
government has stood virtually alone among industrialized countries in opposing serious action on 
climate change.”). 
 199.  For context and a cogent discussion on the arithmetic of U.S. emissions in the past and 
continuing emissions (including in the future) and resulting harm see Farber, supra note 5, at 385–87 
(“The [temporal pattern from 1800 to 2004], obviously, is a sharp upward movement in the amount of 
[U.S.] emissions. . . . [T]he United States is on track to emit as much this decade [2000 to 2010] as it 
did for the entire period from 1900 to 1940. Even if we were to stabilize the level of CO2 in the 
atmosphere, climate change would continue for several decades and to a lesser extent thereafter. On the 
other hand, if we were able to reduce greenhouse gas emissions sharply, global temperature increases 
would moderate within a decade.”). 
 200.  See, e.g., Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1567 (“While the emissions of the United States 
are growing relatively slowly, that nation remains by far the largest contributor to the existing ‘stock’ of 
greenhouse gases. Because of its past contributions, does the United States owe remedial action or 
material compensation to those nations, or those citizens, most likely to be harmed by climate 
change?”).  Clearly, Posner and Sunstein ignore and underplay the arithmetic of U.S. emissions. Even if 
China’s annual emissions today exceeds the United States’ that does not mean the United States’ 
emissions are erased or become zero. 
 201.  Id. at 1592. 
 202.  See discussion supra notes 199–200. 
 203.  See Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1592. 
 204.  Notably, Aristotle’s original discussion on justice focuses on the notion of justice and not 
specific laws such as tort. See ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V (Betty Radice et al. eds., 
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philosophy of corrective justice stands reduced to tort law.205 Accepting 
Posner and Sunstein’s proposition will lead to the following absurd result – 
if tort law requirements are not fulfilled, all corrective justice claims will be 
erased. 
 This Article agrees with Posner and Sunstein’s analysis that a justice 
theory, perhaps based upon “welfarist considerations,” as they call it, may 
be better suited to address the climate change issue.206 However, this study 
differs from Posner and Sunstein’s conclusion that the United States is not 
responsible for its emissions because of the “China myth.” Posner and 
Sunstein’s objection can be stated thusly: On the one hand, China is not 
made responsible for its emissions. On the other hand, the present regime 
requires the United States to compensate the victims, which in this case 
includes China, even though China is one of the largest emitters today.207  
 Significantly, the empirical analysis in this Article disproves the factual 
assumption central to Posner and Sunstein’s thesis. The Protocol does not 
insist that the United States must transfer funds to China through the 
emissions market. The Kyoto Protocol rules only require industrialized 
nations, such as the United States (if it ratifies the Protocol), to limit their 
emissions. The United States is perfectly free to offset its emission 
reduction targets through domestic efforts. If any U.S. firm fails to meet its 
target, it is free to purchase credits from other U.S. firms, or from sellers in 
any other nation.208 There is no insistence that the United States purchase 
only from China. Moreover, as the empirical study ably demonstrates, non-
Chinese traders now own most of the credits initially earned by China. 
Hence, unlike Posner and Sunstein’s claim, the existing framework 
scarcely compels ‘innocent U.S. citizens of today’ to make reparation to 
non-victims in China. 
 
J.A.K. Thomson trans., Penguin Classics 2004). Aristotle’s original discussion focuses on justice, and 
two forms of particular justice –  one involving distributions of honor or money or things that may be 
divided, and a second part that plays a rectifying part in transactions between men. Philosophy does not 
insist that the concept of justice is manifest as tort law; rather, tort law theorists have reached backward 
to justify tort remedies on the basis of a justice philosophy. See, e.g., Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective 
Justice in a Nutshell, 52 U. TORONTO. L.J. 349, 349 (2002) (explaining that “corrective justice has 
become central to contemporary theories of private law,” such as tort, and this is the result of legal 
scholars theorizing and drawing connections with and seeking ontological reasons); ERNEST J. 
WEINRIB, CORRECTIVE JUSTICE 15–16  (Timothy Endicott et al. eds., 2012).. 
 205.  Stated as equations, because the following equation 1 is true, that does not support the 
conclusion that equation 2 is correct. 
Corrective Justice  Tort (Equation 1) 
Therefore, Corrective Justice ← Tort (Equation 2) 
 206.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1612. 
 207.  Id. 
 208.  See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 4, Annex B. See also the discussion on four conditions that 
would need to be fulfilled for the United States to purchase credits from China, in supra Part II.. 
Anand - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/17/2014  10:21 AM 
Fall 2013]     THE U.S., CHINA, AND THE FUTURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 51 
 Before turning to the Conclusion, this Part will make a few 
observations that will be important for the development of climate justice 
theory in the future. A key theoretical objection that Posner and Sunstein 
put forward is that the existing framework fails to fulfill the “correlativity” 
condition of corrective justice theory.209  In other words, they contend that 
under the present regime, there is a mismatch between the parties being 
held responsible and the parties who are injured or who must be paid 
damages. Posner and Sunstein argue: First, the Protocol imposes liability 
on many innocent parties210 Second, since only future generations are 
effected, current citizens of developing countries cannot claim to be victims 
of climate change (or at least the claim is pre-mature).211 Essentially, they 
insist corrective justice is negated because a finite list of wrongdoers and 
victims cannot be matched today.212 
 The academic focus on wrongdoers, victims, and the need for a mirror 
relationship between the two (rather than the conduct or “creating 
effluents”) obfuscates the concept of “personality” that informs theories of 
justice. The normative concept of personality informing the theory of 
justice or even responsibility for outcomes is not new. Ernest Weinrib, for 
instance, discusses the Kantian concept of personality, and argues it is not 
necessary for a plaintiff’s loss to be precisely equal to defendant’s gain to 
fulfill the correlativity feature of corrective justice.213 
 Similarly, Tony Honoré states, justice “presupposes that people are 
responsible for what they do and . . . for the outcome of what they do.”214 
In fact, Honoré posits that people are responsible for outcomes of their 
actions whether or not such results are intended or foreseeable (“outcome 
responsibility”).215 Honoré’s theory is particularly apropos for and provides 
four benefits to climate justice theory. First, it provides a theoretical 
framework for when a state (or community) may be justified in holding a 
party responsible for its actions, even in the absence of fault. Honoré 
envisages a duty to pay compensation or a fine independent of the moral 
 
 209.  WEINRIB, supra note 204, at 15–21. 
 210.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1593. (“Many Americans today are, of course, 
immigrants or children of immigrants, and so not the descendants of greenhouse-gas-emitting 
Americans of the past.”). 
 211.  Id. at 1594–96 (arguing future citizens of developing countries subject to climate effects may 
be the victims with valid corrective justice claim, but these claims would not have “matured” and could 
not be claimed by current non-victims.). 
 212.  In short, “corrective justice requires an identity between the victim and the claimant: the 
person who is injured by the wrongdoer must be the same as the person who has a claim against the 
wrongdoer.” Id. at 1595. 
 213.  WEINRIB, supra note 204, at 15. 
 214.  TONY HONORÉ, RESPONSIBILITY AND FAULT 7 (1999). 
 215.  Id. at 14. 
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blameworthiness of the conduct,216 which answers Posner and Sunstein’s 
concern that the emissions accord is also holding non-wrongdoers liable.217 
 Second, outcome responsibility also answers another objection that 
Posner and Sunstein point out. They argue that the Protocol cannot be 
justified as an amalgam of corrective and distributive justice as these are 
mutually exclusive. According to Posner and Sunstein, an emissions accord 
could no longer be justified under corrective justice if it includes elements 
of distributive justice.218 In effect, they rely on the Aristotelian historical 
distinction between corrective and distributive justice.219 Honoré’s outcome 
responsibility comes to the rescue of the Kyoto Protocol, and shows that 
corrective and distributive justice may not be as mutually exclusive as 
Posner and Sunstein claim. Honoré argues:  Outcome responsibility “is 
“inseparable from our status as persons,” or, “is central to “the identity and 
character of the agent.”220 Agency or personality in turn, are inextricably 
linked to corrective and distributive justice: 
Our responsibility for actions and outcomes requires us to bear the risk 
of bad luck both in the way we are constituted and in the external 
circumstances in which we find ourselves. . . . . . .[This] system of 
responsibility enables us to profit from good luck if what we do turns out 
better than we intended or foresaw. . . . . . .[T]he credit we receive from 
what turns out well balances the discredit we incur for what turns out 
badly. We cannot take the credit without the discredit, since that would 
be to violate the principle of taking the rough with the smooth – a 
principle that possesses moral force and can perhaps be regarded as a 
form of distributive (risk-distributive justice).221 
 In short, “[o]utcome responsibility is a condition of corrective justice, 
but the justification of outcome responsibility depends in part on the justice 
of allocating responsibility according to risk, which is a matter of 
distributive justice.”222 
 Third, outcome responsibility dissolves Posner and Sunstein’s problem 
with holding collectivities responsible.  Posner and Sunstein insist that the 
climate argument fails to fulfill the standards required for a valid corrective 
justice argument because it renders collectivities, such as nations, morally 
responsible for individuals’ actions.223 According to Honoré, “[a]ccepting 
 
 216.  Id. 
 217.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1597–98. 
 218.  Id. 
 219.  See discussion and sources cited supra note 204. 
 220.  HONORÉ, supra note 214, at 10. 
 221.  Id. at 9. 
 222.  Id. at 13. 
 223.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1565, 1595. 
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responsibility for our actions makes for a better society,”224 and “in a 
collective interest,” the law could impose liability.225  
 Fourth, outcome responsibility would also be able to explain the 
“common yet differentiated responsibility” principle and other principles 
adopted by the Convention.226 For instance, while providing a theoretical 
basis for responsibility, Honoré provides flexibility for a narrower notion of 
legal liability.227 In the context of the climate treaty, Honoré’s theory 
enables us to recognize that all nations are responsible for emissions, and 
yet, create a law that imposes liability on a smaller subset of outcomes or 
countries. Thus, a theory built on this precept of outcome responsibility 
would: (a) accommodate the controversial “common yet differentiated 
responsibility” standard adopted by the Convention, which Posner and 
Sunstein label as “doublespeak,”228 and (b) answer the United States’ 
objection that the climate accord imposes different standards on the United 
States than it does on China.229 Clearly, outcome responsibility resolves the 
analytical objections Posner and Sunstein allude to. 
 The outcome responsibility philosophy in conjunction with broad 
moral and political philosophy, including John Rawls’ classic, A Theory of 
Justice230 raises interesting possibilities for the future development of a 
normative justification for climate justice.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
This Article provides the first empirical study testing whether 
ratification of the Kyoto Protocol will result in the massive wealth transfers 
feared by the United States.  To the contrary, the evidence suggested  that 
the “China argument” may be a myth. Legal academics and legislators have 
proceeded on the presumption that the “China argument” is true. The 
“China argument” has been an especially thorny problem for academics. 
Legal scholars have been unable to craft a persuasive and cogent theory on 
why America should participate in the Protocol, if the existing regime will 
transfer huge sums of U.S. money to China. Indeed, justice theorists such 
as Posner and Sunstein have argued that under existing theories of justice 
 
 224.  HONORÉ, supra note 214, at 10. 
 225.  Id. at 9. 
 226.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1607. See also Wiener, supra note 3, at 1824 n.67 
(arguing that “extra allowances” would be needed for developing countries to make participation 
attractive in an international regime.) 
 227.  HONORÉ, supra note 214, at 1. 
 228.  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 3, at 1607. 
 229.  See supra notes 30, 31, 34. 
 230.  JOHN RAWLS, THE THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971). See generally AMARTYA SEN, IDEA OF 
JUSTICE (2009). 
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the United States has no obligation to ratify the Protocol as long as it does 
not place similar responsibilities and financial burdens on China as it would 
on the United States.231 Dan Farber sought to answer justice theorists’ 
argument with an argument from moral theory, saying that the United 
States is “morally responsible” for its emissions, and that its obligations are 
independent of China’s responsibilities for its emissions.232 Farber’s 
response may be logically correct but fails to alleviate U.S. concern that the 
Protocol would become another avenue for American wealth to flow into 
China. 
In fact, the U.S. Senate has refused to ratify the Protocol because it 
treats China differently than the United States. Senator Chuck Hagel 
(during Senate discussions on the Byrd-Hagel Resolution that he jointly 
proposed to reject the Protocol) chastised the administration for 
“advocating legally binding emission reductions for the United States and 
not for nearly 130 other countries, like China.”233 Senator Byrd emphasized 
America’s refusal to join the Protocol was directly connected to the 
Protocol’s provisions that did not bind China in a manner similar to the 
United States.  He stated that, so long as the treaty did not impose 
restrictions on China, “There will be no incentive for the Senate to approve 
such a treaty. I can guarantee you that there will be a mountain in the way 
which a mustard seed of faith will not, in itself, remove.”234 
Legal scholars and law-makers have presumed the “China argument” is 
true, without verifying whether this assumption has any basis in fact. This 
Article unearthed empirical evidence which shows that facts do not support 
the “China argument”. The study revealed China alienated most of the 
carbon credits initially awarded to Chinese corporations. Indeed, there is 
little evidence or possibility that ratifying the emissions treaty will result in 
China gaining huge sums from America.  
Thus, the survey exposed the “China argument” as a myth, and makes 
two important contributions. One, this Article eliminated the key issue 
preventing justice and moral theorists from crafting a climate justice 
theory, and thus, addresses a critical gap in scholarship. Two, it renders 
vital assistance to legislators too.  Assuming the “China myth” is correct, 
the U.S. Senate continues to oppose U.S. participation in the Protocol and 
emission regulation.235 Thus, by arresting the “China myth,” this Article 
dissolves the main objection pointed to by the U.S. Senate when opposing 
U.S. participation in the international emissions accord.   
 
 231.  See supra note 6. 
 232.  See supra note 8. 
 233.  S. Rep. No. 105-54, at 10 (1997) 
 234.  Id. at 18. 
 235.  See supra notes 31, 34. 
Anand - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/17/2014  10:21 AM 
Fall 2013]     THE U.S., CHINA, AND THE FUTURE OF THE KYOTO PROTOCOL 55 
Indeed, this Article epitomizes Michael Heise’s argument, “Where 
empirical questions lurk, data warrant at least as much respect as that 
accorded opinions and words. . . . . . . Empirical work sheds important light 
on old legal issues and identifies and speaks to issues that the more 
traditional theoretical and doctrinal genres cannot reach.”236 This study 
joins the long and distinguished line of scholarship that has publicized the 
importance of empirical research to law.237  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 236.  Michael Heise, The Importance of Being Empirical, 26 PEPP. L. REV. 807, 833-34 (1999). 
 237.  For the classic exposition on point, see Peter Shuck, Why don’t Law Professors Do More 
Empirical Research?, 39 J. LEGAL EDUC. 323, 323-24 (1989). See also Richard Posner, OVERCOMING 
LAW 210 (1995); Derek Bok, A Flawed System of Law Practice and Training, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 570 
(1983); Lawrence Friedman, The Law and Society Movement, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1986); Richard 
Posner, Against Constitutional Theory, 73 N.Y.U.L. REV.1 (1998). Scholars from Justice Holmes to 
legal realists have emphasized the importance of empirical work. For early mentions as well as the 
history behind empirical legal research, see Michael Heise, The Past, Present and Future of Empirical 
Legal Scholarship, Judicial Decision Making and the New Empiricism, 4 ILL. L. REV. 819 (2002). 
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APPENDIX 1: COMPLETE LIST OF COUNTRIES WITH REGISTERED PROJECTS 
(REPRESENTED IN FIGURES 6 AND 6A) 
 
The following table includes all individual nations comprising the “Rest 
of” regional categories as well as the large contributors listed in Figure 6, 
totaling to 4,908 Projects. 
 
Host Nation 
Percentage of 
Projects 
Number of 
Projects  
China 49.49% 2429 
India 19.64% 964 
Brazil 4.95% 243 
Mexico 3.16% 155 
Vietnam 2.91% 143 
Malaysia 2.44% 120 
Indonesia 1.69% 83 
Thailand 1.65% 81 
Republic of Korea 1.55% 76 
Chile 1.26% 62 
Philippines 1.24% 61 
Rest of South America 2.95 % 145 
Bolivia 0.12% 6 
Uruguay 0.18% 9 
Paraguay 0.04% 2 
Guyana 0.02% 1 
Ecuador 0.39% 19 
Argentina 0.63% 31 
Colombia 0.86% 42 
Peru 0.71% 35 
Rest of Asia 2.77% 136 
Bangladesh 0.06% 3 
Cambodia 0.12% 6 
Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea 0.02% 1 
Laos 0.08% 4 
Bhutan 0.04% 2 
Mongolia 0.08% 4 
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Nepal 0.12% 6 
Pakistan 0.31% 15 
Singapore 0.04% 2 
Sri Lanka 0.22% 11 
Armenia 0.10% 5 
Azerbaijan 0.02% 1 
Cyprus 0.16% 8 
Iran 0.22% 11 
Qatar 0.02% 1 
Syria 0.06% 3 
UAE 0.12% 6 
Uzbekistan 0.29% 14 
Georgia 0.06% 3 
Israel 0.61% 30 
Rest of Africa 2.04% 100 
Cameroon 0.04% 2 
Democratic Republic of the 
Congo 0.04% 2 
Ethiopia 0.02% 1 
Ghana 0.02% 1 
Jordan 0.08% 4 
Kenya 0.16% 8 
Lesotho 0.02% 1 
Liberia 0.02% 1 
Rwanda 0.06% 3 
Senegal 0.08% 4 
Cote d’Ivorie 0.06% 3 
Tunisia 0.04% 2 
Uganda 0.24% 12 
Morocco 0.16% 8 
Mozambique 0.02% 1 
Zambia 0.02% 1 
Madagascar 0.04% 2 
Mali 0.02% 1 
Rest of Europe 0.29% 14 
Albania 0.06% 3 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina 0.02% 1 
Serbia  0.08% 4 
The former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia 0.04% 2 
Republic of Moldova 0.08% 4 
Rest of North and Central 
America 1.79% 88 
Costa Rica 0.22% 11 
Cuba 0.04% 2 
El Salvador 0.16% 8 
Guatemala 0.29% 14 
Panama 0.20% 10 
Jamaica 0.04% 2 
Dominican Republic 0.10% 5 
Nicaragua 0.18% 9 
Honduras 0.55% 27 
Rest of Oceania 0.16% 8 
Fiji 0.04% 2 
Papua New Guinea 0.12% 6 
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APPENDIX 2: COMPLETE LIST OF POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDERS 
TABLE 1: POWER OF ATTORNEY HOLDERS (LEADING TO FIGURE 7) 
 
Methodology: Please note as per carbon market rules, the Executive Board 
accepts different types of powers of attorney. The most important involved 
“the authority to instruct the secretariat and communicate with the C[lean] 
D[evelopment] M[echanism] E[xecutive] B[oard] on the allocation and 
forwarding of C[ertified] E[mission] R[eduction]s” This is the precise 
power that was measured in this study. This power of attorney may be 
“sole,” “shared,” or “joint” though the vast majority were either “sole” or 
“joint.” Additional rows were included and identified as “joint” or “shared” 
when applicable. When a buyer had the sole right to provide instructions, it 
was assigned 1. When a buyer had joint or shared rights with another 
buyer, each buyer was assigned .50 in order to create Figure 7. 
 
 Summary  
Total Number of Projects in China - 2168i  
Power of Attorney Holders Number 
of 
Projects 
Percentage 
of 
Projects** 
No Power of Attorney on Record 101 4.659% 
Only Chinese Party 142 6.550% 
International Buyer 1925 88.792% 
 Total number of registered projects as of July 7, 2012. 
2 Percentage calculated based on total number of China projects (i.e., 
2,168). 
 
International Buyers 
 
 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
1 AandT Carbon Asset Co., 
Limited 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
2 ACT Carbon Capital Ltd. 5 0.231% Sole 5 
3 Arcadia Energy (Suisse) 
S.A. 
6 0.277% Sole 2 
Joint 4 
4 Arreon Carbon* 53 2.445% Sole 43 
Anand - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/17/2014  10:21 AM 
60 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:1 
 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
Joint 10 
5 Asian Development Bank, 
as Trustee for the Asia 
Pacific Carbon Fund† †† 
17 0.830% Sole 8 
Joint 8 
6 Asian Development Bank, 
as Trustee for the Asia 
Pacific Carbon Fund and 
the Future Carbon Fund† ††
1 0.830% Sole  
Joint 1 
7 Asja Environment 
International B.V. 
Mendrisio Branch 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
8 Barclays Bank PLC 12 0.554% Sole 12 
9 Biogas Technology Ltd 2 0.092% Sole 2 
10 BKW FMB Energie AG 2 0.092% Sole  
Joint 2 
11 Blue World Carbon Capital 
PCC 
6 0.277% Sole  
Shared 2 
Joint 4 
12 BNP Paribas 5 0.231% Sole 1 
Joint 4 
13 Bunge Emissions Holdings 
S.A.R.L. 
7 0.323% Sole 7 
14 Cambridge Funds 
Investment Co., Ltd 
7 0.323% Sole 7 
15 Camco* 52 2.399% Sole 30 
Joint 22 
16 Cantor Fitzgerald Europe 1 0.046% Sole 1 
17 Carbon Asset 148.5 6.850% Sole 144 
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 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
Management*†† Shared 3.5 
Joint 1 
18 Carbon Capital 
Management*†† 
16   0.738% Sole 8 
Shared 1.5 
Joint 6.5 
19 Carbon Resource 
Management* 
126 5.812% Sole 83 
Joint 43 
20 Cargill International S.A.* 29 1.338% Sole 29 
21 Caspervandertak 
Consulting BV 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
22 CCAN Consulting GmbH†† 0.5 0.023% Sole  
Joint 0.5 
23 Ceres Carbon Securities 
Ltd. 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
24 ČEZ, a.s. 3 0.138% Sole 3 
25 CF Carbon Fund II Limited 10 0.461% Sole 10 
26 CFL Carbon Limited 1 0.046% Sole 1 
27 China Carbon N.V†† 8 0.369% Sole 6 
Joint 2 
28 Chubu Electric Power Co., 
Inc. 
4 0.185% Sole 4 
29 Citigroup Global Markets 
Limited 
5 0.231% Sole  
Joint 5 
30 Climate Bridge Ltd. 6 0.277% Sole 5 
Joint 1 
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 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
31 Climate Cent Foundation 1 0.046% Sole 1 
32 Climate Change Capital* 25 1.153% Sole 25 
33 Climate Change Investment 
II S.A.SICAR†† 
1 0.046% Sole  
Joint 1 
34 Climate Corporation 
Emissions Trading GmbH 
18 0.830% Sole 18 
35 Climate Opportunity Fund 
Ky†† 
0.5 0.023% Sole 
 
 
Joint 0.5 
36 Climate Protection Invest 
AG†† 
3.5 0.161% Sole 2 
Joint 1.5 
37 ConocoPhillips (U.K.)* 6 0.277% Sole  
Joint 6 
38 Credit Suisse International 18 0.830% Sole 7 
Joint 11 
39 Daewoo International 
(Deutschland) GmbH 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
40 Daiwa* 7 0.323% Sole 7 
41 Danish Energy Agency* 10 0.461% Sole 4 
Joint 6 
42 Deutsche Bank* 23 1.061% Sole 23 
43 Dexia Carbon Capital S.a.r.l 3 0.138% Sole 3 
44 ECO Asset Incorporated* 21 0.969% Sole 5 
Joint 16 
45 E.ON Carbon Sourcing 
GmbH†† 
0.5 0.023% Sole 
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 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
Joint 0.5 
46 ECO BANK LTD 1 0.046% Sole 1 
47 Eco-Carbone S.A.S†† 0.5 0.023% Sole  
Joint 0.5 
48 Eco-Frontier Carbon 
Partners Limited†† 
1 0.046% Sole  
Joint 1 
49 ecolutions Trading GmbH†† 0.5 0.023% Sole  
Joint 0.5 
50 EcoSecurities* 118 5.443% Sole 88 
Joint 30 
51 Eco-Tec Asia (UK) Ltd. 6 0.277% Sole 6 
52 EDF Trading*†† 72 3.321% Sole 49 
Joint 23 
 
53 Edison Spa 10 0.461% Sole 10 
54 Electrabel NV/SA†† 18.5 0.853% Sole 3 
Joint 15.5 
55 ELECTRADE S.p.A. 1 0.046% Sole 1 
56 Electric Power 
Development Co., Ltd. 
8 0.369% Sole 8 
57 Emissionshandels 
Gesellschaft Bavaria Gmbh
3 0.138% Sole 3 
58 EnBW Trading GmbH 7 0.323% Sole 6 
Joint 1 
59 Endesa* 11 0.507% Sole 1 
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 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
Joint 10 
60 Eneco Energy Trade B.V.†† 5.5 0.254% Sole 4 
Joint 1.5 
61 ENEL Trade SpA 46 2.122% Sole 44 
Joint 2 
62 Energy Systems 
International B.V. 
31 1.430% Sole 30 
Joint 1 
63 Equity + Environmental 
Assets Ireland Limited 
7 0.323% Sole 7 
64 Essent Trading* 6 0.277% Sole 2 
Joint 4 
65 Europe New Energy 
Investment Capital Limited
2 0.092% Sole 1 
Joint 1 
66 First Carbon Fund Ltd 1 0.046% Sole 1 
67 First Climate (Switzerland) 
AG 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
68 Gaisi Peony* 2 0.092% Sole 2 
69 Gazprom Marketing and 
Trading*†† 
8.5 0.392% Sole 6 
Joint 2.5 
70 General Energy Capital 
Co., Ltd. 
4 0.185% Sole 4 
71 GETEC Climate Projects 
GmbH 
6 0.277% Sole 2 
Joint 4 
72 Goldman Sachs 
International 
2 0.092% Sole   
Joint 2 
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 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
73 Greenscot Limited 1 0.046% Sole 1 
74 GreenStream Network Plc†† 19.5 0.899% Sole 12 
Shared 0.5 
Joint 7 
75 Grey K Environmental 
(Europe) II Ltd. 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
76 Grütter Consulting AG†† 1.5 0.069% Sole 1 
Joint 0.5 
77 Gunvor International B.V. 
Amsterdam Geneva 
Branch†† 
13.5 0.623% Sole 9 
Shared 0.5 
Joint 4 
78 HANWHA Europe GmbH 1 0.046% Sole 1 
79 Holcim Environment 
Services S.A. 
4 0.185% Sole  
Joint 4 
80 ICECAP Carbon Portfolio 
Limited 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
81 ICF - International Clean 
Fund* 
4 0.185% Sole 4 
82 IFC-Netherlands Carbon 
Facility (INCaF) 
1 0.046% Sole  
Joint 1 
83 ING Bank N.V. 1 0.046% Sole 1 
84 Innovative Carbon 
Investment Corporation 
3 0.138% Sole 3 
85 International Bank for 
Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD)* 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
86 International Bank for 18 0.830% Sole 17 
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Reconstruction and 
Development (IBRD) as 
Trustee* 
Joint 1 
87 International Finance 
Corporation as Trustee of 
the IFC-Netherlands 
Carbon Facility (INCaF) 
2 0.092% Sole  
Joint 2 
88 ITOCHU Corporation 4 0.185% Sole   3 
Joint 1 
89 J.P. Morgan Ventures 
Energy Corporation 
3 0.138% Sole 3 
90 Japan Carbon Finance, Ltd. 6 0.277% Sole 6 
91 JGC Corporation 4 0.185% Sole 4 
92 J-TEC Co., Ltd.†† 4.5 0.208% Sole  
Joint 4.5 
93 Kansai Electric Power Co., 
Inc.* 
5 0.231% Sole 1 
Joint 4 
94 KfW* 16 0.738% Sole 16 
95 Kommunalkredit Public 
Consulting*†† 
40.5 1.868% Sole 38 
Joint 2.5 
96 Kyushu Electric Power Co., 
INC. 
 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
97 Lakewood Carbon Corp.†† 5 0.231% Sole 4 
Joint 1 
98 Luso Carbon Fund*†† 6.5 0.300% Sole 6 
Joint 0.5 
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99 Macquarie Bank Limited 20 0.923% Sole 18 
Joint 2 
100 Marubeni Corporation 40 1.845% Sole 39 
Joint 1 
101 Masefield New Energies 
AG 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
102 Mercuria Energy Trading 
S.A. 
21 0.969% Sole 11 
Joint 10 
103 Merrill Lynch Commodities 
(Europe) Limited 
6 0.277% Sole  
Joint 6 
104 MGM Carbon Portfolio 
S.a.r.l. 
37 1.707% Sole 37 
105 Ministry for Foreign Affairs 
of Finland 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
106 Mitsubishi* 56 2.583% Sole 52 
Joint 4 
107 Mitsui and Co., Ltd 13 0.600% Sole 10 
Joint 3 
108 Morgan Stanley and Co. 
International plc 
4 0.185% Sole 4 
109 National Bio Energy Co., 
Ltd.†† 
0.5 0.023% Sole  
Joint 0.5 
110 NATIXIS Environnement 
and Infrastructures 
12 0.554% Sole 12 
111 Natsource* 9 0.415% Sole 8 
Joint 1 
Anand - Final (Do Not Delete) 7/17/2014  10:21 AM 
68 DUKE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW & POLICY FORUM [Vol. XXIV:1 
 Power of Attorney 
Holders 
Number 
of 
Projects
Percentage 
of 2,168 
Projects 
Type 
of 
Rights
Projects 
112 New Energy and Industrial 
Technology Development 
Organization 
3 0.138% Sole 3 
113 Nippon Steel Corporation 1 0.046% Sole  
Shared 1 
114 NL Agency 1 0.046% Sole 1 
115 Noble Carbon Credits 38 1.753% Sole 27 
Joint 11 
116 Nomura International Plc 4 0.185% Sole 1 
Joint 3 
117 Nordic Carbon Fund Ky 1 0.046% Sole  
Joint 1 
118 Norwegian Ministry of 
Finance 
20 0.923% Sole 1 
Joint 19 
119 Nuon Energy Trade and 
Wholesale 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
120 OneCarbon International 
B.V. 
9 0.415% Sole 7 
Joint 2 
121 ORBEO 4 0.185% Sole 3 
Joint 1 
122 Origin Carbon Management 
Limited 
6 0.277% Sole 6 
123 Originate Carbon* 5 0.231% Sole 4 
Joint 1 
124 PEAR Carbon Offset 1 0.046% Sole  
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Initiative, Ltd.†† Joint 1 
125 Post 2012 Carbon Credit 
Fund C.V.†† 
4 0.185% Sole 1 
Joint 3 
126 Primary Carbon 
International Limited 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
127 Q.C.A. AG†† 4.5 0.208% Sole 4 
Joint 0.5 
128 Rabobank International* 5 0.231% Sole 2 
Joint 3 
129 Renaissance Carbon 
Investment Ltd. 
7 0.323% Sole 7 
130 RWE* 99 4.566% Sole 74 
Joint 25 
131 Shell Trading International* 21 0.969% Sole 3 
Joint 18 
132 Showa Shell Sekiyu K.K. 1 0.046% Sole 1 
133 Sindicatum Carbon Capital* 10 0.461% Sole 10 
134 Smart Energy Co., Ltd. 4 0.185% Sole 4 
135 Sojitz Corporation 1 0.046% Sole 1 
136 Solvay Energy Services 
SAS†† 
3.5 0.161% Sole 2 
Joint 1.5 
137 South Pole Carbon Asset 
Management Ltd. 
7 0.323% Sole 7 
138 SSE Energy Supply Ltd. 4 0.185% Sole 4 
139 Standard Bank Plc†† 8.5 0.392% Sole 8 
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Joint 0.5 
140 Sumitomo Corporation†† 18.5 0.853% Sole 6 
Joint 12.5 
141 Swedish Energy Agency* 2 0.092% Sole 2 
142 Swiss Carbon Assets Ltd. 2 0.092% Sole 2 
143 Tepia Corporation Japan 
Co., Ltd. 
3 0.138% Sole 3 
144 The Chugoku Electric 
Power Co., Inc. 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
145 Tokyo Electric Power* 8 0.369% Sole 3 
Joint 5 
146 Total Gas and Power 
Limited 
9 0.415% Sole 2 
Joint 7 
147 Toyota Tsusho Corporation 2 0.092% Sole 2 
148 Trading Emissions* 34 1.568% Sole 34 
149 Tricorona Carbon Asset 
Management Pte Ltd†† 
3.5 0.161% Sole  
Shared 3.5 
150 Ultimate Carbon Trading 
Ltd 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
151 United Carbon Credits 
Limited 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
152 UPM Umwelt-Projekt-
Management GmbH 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
153 Vattenfall Energy Trading 
Netherlands N.V.†† 
6 0.277% Sole 5 
Joint 1 
154 Vitol S.A. 98 4.520% Sole 75 
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Joint 23 
155 Voestalpine AG 4 0.185% Sole 4 
156 WCCI World Carbon 
Credit Investment Limited 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
157 Wienerberger AG 1 0.046% Sole 1 
158 Zero Emissions 
Technologies, S.A. 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
Total Projects with International 
Buyers 
1925  
* These entities include related entities. For a detailed break-up of each 
individual entity’s share, see Table 2 below. 
† The entry Asian Development Bank, as Trustee for the Asia Pacific 
Carbon Fund, has been split into two entries, (a) when Asia Pacific 
Carbon Fund was the sole buyer, and (b) when two buyers, the Asia 
Pacific Carbon Fund and the Future Carbon Fund, were involved, but 
both conferred trustee status on the Asian Development Bank. 
†† For projects that involved two buyers, rather than one, each buyer’s share 
was halved. This explained the fractions in the number of projects. For a 
full list of such buyers who together bought a project, see Table 3 below. 
 
TABLE 2: INDIVIDUAL CORPORATE ENTITIES 
(COMBINED IN TABLE 1 AND FIGURE 7) 
 
Methodology: As noted in Table 1, the vast majority of projects were 
granted “sole” power of attorney. When the powers of attorney granted 
were “shared” or “joint,” rows to that effect were included in the Table 
below. 
 
 Corporate 
Group 
(named in 
Table 1) 
Company Name Number 
of 
Projects 
under 
Company 
Percentage 
of Projects 
Type of 
Rights 
Projects 
1 Arreon 
Carbon 
 
Arreon Carbon 
Trading Limited 
 
21 0.969% Sole  11 
Joint 10 
Arreon Carbon 
UK Limited 
14 0.646% Sole  14 
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Arreon Carbon 
UK Ltd. 
18 0.830% Sole 18 
2 Camco Camco Carbon 
Credits Limited 
12 0.554% Sole 6 
Joint 6 
Camco Carbon 
Limited 
32.5 1.476% Sole 17 
Joint 15.5 
Camco 
International 
Limited 
6.5 0.277% Sole 6 
Joint  .5 
Camco 
International 
Ltd. 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
3 Carbon 
Asset 
Manage
ment 
 
Carbon Asset 
Management 
Sweden AB  
 
124 5.720% Sole 121 
Shared 2 
Joint 1 
Carbon Asset 
Management 
Sweden Pte Ltd. 
24.5 1.130% Sole  23 
Shared 1.5 
4 Carbon 
Capital 
Manage
ment 
 
 
 
Carbon Capital 
Management 
(Japan) 
 1 0.046% Sole  1 
Carbon Capital 
Management, 
Inc. 
9.5 0.438% Sole  5 
Shared 0.5 
Joint 4 
Carbon Capital 
Management, 
Inc. (Japan) 
5.5 0.254% Sole 1 
Shared 1 
Joint 3.5 
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5 Carbon 
Resource 
Manage
ment 
 
Carbon 
Resource 
Management 
Ltd. 
8 0.369% Sole 7 
Joint 1 
Carbon 
Resource 
Management 
S.A. 
118 5.443% Sole 76 
Joint 42 
6 Cargill 
Internati
onal 
 
 
Cargill 
International 
S.A. 
 10 0.461% Sole 10 
Green Hercules 
Trading Limited 
18 0.830% Sole 18 
Green Hercules 
Trading Limited 
(A Cargill 
Company) 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
7 
 
Climate 
Change 
Capital 
 
 
Climate Change 
Capital Carbon 
Fund II s.á r.l 
23 1.061% Sole 23 
Climate Change 
Capital Carbon 
Managed 
Account Limited 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
Climate Change 
Capital China 
Limited 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
8 ConocoP
hillips 
(U.K. 
 
ConocoPhillips 
(U.K.) Ltd.  
2 0.092% Sole   
Joint 2 
ConocoPhillips 
(U.K.) Limited 
4 0.185% Sole  
Joint 4 
9 Daiwa 
 
 
Daiwa PI 
Partners Co. Ltd.
4 0.185% Sole  4 
Daiwa Securities 
SMBC Co. Ltd.  
2 0.092% Sole 2 
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Daiwa Securities 
SMBC Principal 
Investments Co., 
Ltd. 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
10 Danish 
Energy 
Agency 
 
Danish Ministry 
of Climate and 
Energy, Danish 
Energy Agency 
 4 0.185% Sole  4 
The Danish 
Energy Agency  
6 0.277% Sole  
Joint 6 
11 Deutsche 
Bank 
 
 
Deutsche Bank 
AG 
5 0.231% Sole 5 
Deutsche Bank 
AG (Filiale 
London) 
5 0.231% Sole  5 
Deutsche Bank 
AG, London 
Branch 
13 0.600% Sole 13 
12 ECO 
Asset 
Incorpor
ated 
ECO Asset 
Incorporated 
was combined 
with Eco Asset 
Incorporated 
     
13 EcoSecur
ities 
 
 
 
EcoSecurities 
Carbon 1 Ltd.  
5 0.231% Sole 5 
EcoSecurities 
Group Limited  
1 0.046% Sole  1 
EcoSecurities 
Group Plc 
70 3.229% Sole  48 
Joint 22 
EcoSecurities 
International 
Limited  
30 1.384% Sole  25 
Joint 5 
EcoSecurities 
International Ltd 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
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EcoSecurities 
Ltd. 
11 0.507% Sole 8 
Joint 3 
14 EDF 
Trading 
 
EDF Trading 
Limited  
62.5 2.883% Sole  49 
Joint 23.5 
EDF Trading 
Ltd 
 
9.5 
 
0.438% Sole 5 
Joint 4.5 
15 Endesa Endesa Carbono 
S.L.  
 
4 0.185% Sole 0 
Joint 4 
Endesa 
Generación S.A. 
7  
 
0.323% Sole 1 
Joint 6 
16 ENEL 
Trade 
SpA 
ENEL Trade 
SpA was 
combined with 
Enel Trade SpA 
     
17 Essent 
Trading 
Essent Energy 
Trading B.V. 
2 0.092% Sole 1 
Joint 1 
Essent Trading 
International 
S.A. 
4 0.185% Sole 1 
Joint 3 
18 Gaisi 
Peony 
Gaisi Peony 
Capital s.a.r.l 
1 0.046% Sole  1 
Gaisi Peony 
Carbon Capital 
s.a.r.l 
1 0.046% Sole  1 
19 Gazprom 
Marketin
g and 
Trading 
 
Gazprom 
Marketing and 
Trading Limited 
1.5 0.069% Sole 1 
Joint 0.5 
Gazprom 
Marketing and 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
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Trading Ltd. 
Gazprom 
Marketing and 
Trading 
Singapore Pte. 
Ltd. 
5 0.231% Sole 3 
Joint 2 
20 ICF - 
Internati
onal 
Clean 
Fund 
 
ICF - 
International 
Clean Fund LLC 
2 0.092% Sole  2 
ICF - 
International 
Clean Fund LLC 
Lewes, 
Mendrisio 
Branch 
2 0.092% Sole  2 
21 
 
Internati
onal 
Bank for 
Reconstr
uction 
and 
Develop
ment 
(IBRD) 
 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) 
 1 0.046% Sole  1 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) (the 
Netherlands, 
Italy and other 
Parties) 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
22 Internati
onal 
Bank for 
Reconstr
uction 
and 
Develop
ment 
IBRD as Trustee 
of the 
BioCarbon Fund 
1 0.046% Sole  1 
IBRD as Trustee 
of the Italian 
Carbon Fund 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
International 
Bank for 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
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(IBRD) 
as 
Trustee 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) as 
Trustee for the 
Danish Carbon 
Fund 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) as 
Trustee of the 
Carbon Funds 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) as 
Trustee of the 
Community 
Development 
Carbon Fund 
(CDCF) 
4 0.185% Sole 4 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) as 
Trustee of the 
Netherlands 
CDM Facility 
(NCDMF) 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
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and 
Development 
(IBRD) as 
Trustee of the 
Prototype 
Carbon Fund 
(PCF) 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) as 
Trustee of the 
Spanish Carbon 
Fund (SCF) 
3 0.138% Sole  3 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development as 
Trustee of the 
First Tranche of 
the Umbrella 
Carbon Facility 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development as 
Trustee of the 
Italian Carbon 
Fund  
1 0.046% Sole 1 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development as 
Trustee of the 
1 0.046% Sole  
 
Joint 1 
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PCF and 
NCDMF 
The 
International 
Bank for 
Reconstruction 
and 
Development 
(IBRD) as 
Trustee of the 
BioCarbon Fund 
 
1 0.046% 
 
Sole  1 
23 KfW 
 
KfW 13 0.600% Sole 13 
KfW 
Bankengruppe 
3 0.138% Sole 3 
24 Kommun
alkredit 
Public 
Consulti
ng 
 
Kommunalkredit 
Public 
Consulting  
1 0.046% Sole 1 
Kommunalkredit 
Public 
Consulting 
GmbH 
39.5 1.822% Sole 37 
Joint 2.5 
25 Lakewoo
d Carbon 
Corp. 
Lakewood 
Carbon Corp. 
was combined 
with 
LAKEWOOD 
CARBON 
CORP. 
     
26 Luso 
Carbon 
Fund 
 
 
Luso Carbon 
Fund 
 5.5 0.254% Sole  4.5 
Joint 1 
Luso Carbon 
Fund – Fundo 
Especial de 
Investimento 
Fechado 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
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27 Mitsubis
hi 
 
 
 
 
Mitsubishi 
Corporation 
 52  2.399% Sole 49 
Joint 3 
Mitsubishi 
Heavy 
Industries, Ltd. 
1 0.046% Sole  
Joint 1 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Morgan Stanley 
Securities Co., 
Ltd.  
2 0.092% Sole 2 
Mitsubishi UFJ 
Securities Co., 
Ltd.  
1 0.046% Sole  1 
28 NATIXI
S 
Environn
ement 
and 
Infrastru
ctures 
NATIXIS 
Environnement 
and 
Infrastructures 
was combined 
with Natixis 
Environnement 
and 
Infrastructures 
     
29 Natsourc
e 
 
 
 
Natsource Asset 
Management 
Corp. 
3 
 
0.138% Sole 2 
Joint 1 
Natsource Asset 
Management 
Corporation 
3 0.138% Sole  3 
Natsource 
Europe Limited 
2 0.092% Sole 2 
Natsource 
Europe Ltd. 
1 0.046% Sole  1 
30 Noble 
Carbon 
Credits 
 
 
Noble Carbon 
Credits Limit 
 1 0.046% Sole  
Joint 1 
Noble Carbon 34 1.568% Sole 25 
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Credits Limited  Joint 9 
Noble Carbon 
Credits Ltd. 
3 0.138% Sole  2 
Joint 1 
31 ORBEO ORBEO was 
combined with 
Orbeo 
     
32 Originate 
Carbon 
Originate 
Carbon Limited  
2 0.092% Sole 2 
Originate 
Carbon Ltd. 
 
3 
 
0.138% Sole 2 
Joint 1 
33 Raboban
k 
Internati
onal 
 
 
 
Cooperatieve 
Centrale 
Raiffeisen 
Boerenleenbank 
B.A. (trading as) 
Rabobank 
International 
London Branch  
1 0.046% Sole  1 
Rabobank 
International 
3 0.138% Sole  1 
Joint 2 
Rabobank 
International, 
London Branch 
1 0.046% Sole  
Joint 1 
34 RWE 
 
 
 
 
RWE Power AG 
 
43 1.983% Sole 41 
Joint 2 
RWE Power 
Aktiengesellscha
ft 
6 0.277% Sole  6 
RWE Supply 
and Trading 
Netherlands 
B.V. 
6 0.277% Sole 6 
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RWE Supply 
and Trading 
Switzerland S.A. 
44 2.030% Sole 21 
Joint 23 
35 Shell 
Trading 
Internati
onal 
 
 
Shell Trading 
International 
Limited 
11 0.507% Sole 3 
Joint 8 
Shell Trading 
International 
Limited (UK) 
2 0.092% Sole  
Joint 2 
Shell Trading 
International 
Ltd. 
7  0.323% Sole  
Joint 7 
Shell Trading 
International 
Ltd.(UK) 
1 0.046% Sole   
Joint 1 
36 Sindicatu
m 
Carbon 
Capital 
 
 
Sindicatum 
Carbon Capital 
(Cayman) 
Limited 
3 0.138% Sole  3 
Sindicatum 
Carbon Capital 
(China) Ltd. 
1 0.046% Sole  1 
Sindicatum 
Carbon Capital 
Ltd.  
6 0.277% Sole 6 
37 Swedish 
Energy 
Agency 
 
Government of 
Sweden - 
Swedish Energy 
Agency  
1 0.046% Sole 1 
Swedish CDM 
and JI 
Programme 
International 
Climate Policy 
Section Swedish 
Energy Agency 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
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38 Tokyo 
Electric 
Power 
 
 
The Tokyo 
Electric Power 
Co., Inc. 
3 0.138% Sole  1 
Joint 2 
The Tokyo 
Electric Power 
Company, Inc.  
2 0.092% Sole 1 
Joint 1 
The Tokyo 
Electric Power 
Company, 
Incorporated 
2 0.092% Sole   
Joint 2 
Tokyo Electric 
Power Co. 
1 0.046% Sole 1 
39 Total 
Gas and 
Power 
Limited 
Total Gas and 
Power Limited 
was combined 
with TOTAL 
Gas and Power 
Limited 
  
40 Trading 
Emission
s 
 
Trading 
Emissions 
Limited 
1 0.046% Sole  1 
Trading 
Emissions PLC 
33 1.522% Sole  33 
 
 
 
TABLE 3 – LIST OF PROJECTS INVOLVING TWO BUYERS 
 
 Buyer 1 Buyer 2  Project Name 
1 Asian Development 
Bank, as trustee of 
the Future Carbon 
Fund 
Asian Development 
Bank, as trustee of the 
Asia Pacific Carbon 
Fund 
Heqing Solar 
Cooker Project 
II 
2 Asian Development 
Bank, as trustee of 
the Future Carbon 
Fund 
Asian Development 
Bank, as trustee of the 
Asia Pacific Carbon 
Fund 
Heqing Solar 
Cooker Project I 
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 Buyer 1 Buyer 2  Project Name 
3 Eco-Frontier Carbon 
Partners Limited 
Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Fujian Cement 
4# and 5# kilns 
Waste Heat 
Recovery for 
Power 
Generation 
Project 
4 Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam 
Geneva Branch 
Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Hunan Waste 
Gas Based 
Power Project in 
Liangang Group 
5 Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam 
Geneva Branch 
Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Yunnan Sayutuo 
60MW Hydro 
Power Project 
6 Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam 
Geneva Branch 
Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
(Japan) 
Gansu Wuwei 
23MW Zamusi 
Hydropower 
Project 
7 Solvay Energy 
Services SAS 
CCAN Consulting 
GmbH 
Shuangpai 
County 
Yongjiang 
Cascade 
Hydropower 
Project, Hunan, 
P.R. China 
8 Kommunalkredit 
Public Consulting 
GmbH (“KPC”) 
China Carbon N.V. Sichuan 
provincial 
Longchi and 
Caoyuan 9 MW 
Small-scale 
Hydro Power 
Bundle Project 
9 Post 2012 Carbon 
Credit Fund CV 
Climate Change 
Investment II S.A. 
SICAR 
Shenmu County 
Jieneng 
Multipurpose 
Use Power Co. 
Ltd. 100MW 
Semi-coke 
Waste Gas for 
Power 
Generation 
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 Buyer 1 Buyer 2  Project Name 
Project 
10 GreenStream 
Network Plc 
Climate Opportunity 
Fund Ky 
Sichuan 
Fangdaping 
Hydropower 
Project 
11 PEAR Carbon Offset 
Initiative, Ltd. 
E.ON Carbon 
Sourcing GmbH 
Sichuan 
Guang’an 
Caishandong 
Coal Mine 
CMM Power 
Generation 
Project 
12 EDF Trading Ltd. Eco-Carbone S.A.S Yangquan 
Nanmei (Group) 
Co., Ltd. 
Coalmine 
Methane 
Utilization 
Project 
13 Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Eco-Frontier Carbon 
Partners Limited  
Wuda 
Wuhushan Coal 
Mine Methane 
Power 
Generation 
Project 
14 Gazprom Marketing 
and Trading Limited 
ecolutions Trading 
GmbH 
Hunan Daxing 
Small 
Hydropower 
Project 
15 Standard Bank Plc Electrabel NV/SA Hainan Gezhen 
Hydropower 
Project 
16 China Carbon N.V. Eneco Energy Trade 
B.V. 
Shaanxi Shenmu 
Hengdong 
Waste Gas 
Based Electricity 
Generation 
Project 
17 Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam 
Geneva Branch 
Shaanxi 
Provincial Yang 
County Kafang 
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 Buyer 1 Buyer 2  Project Name 
12 MW Small-
scale Hydro 
Power Project 
18 Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
(Japan) 
Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam 
Geneva Branch 
15MW Waste 
Heat Recovery 
and Power 
Generation 
Project in 
Jiangsu Helin 
Cement Co., 
Ltd. 
19 Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam, 
Geneva Branch 
Jiexiu City 
Guotai Green 
Energy Co., Ltd 
Biomass Power 
Generation 
Project in 
Shanxi Province 
20 Carbon Capital 
Management, 
Inc.(Japan) 
Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam, 
Geneva Branch 
Waste Heat 
Recovery and 
Power 
Generation 
Project in Jilin 
Yatai Group 
Mingcheng 
Cement Co., 
Ltd. 
21 Carbon Capital 
Management, Inc. 
Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam, 
Geneva Branch  
Waste Heat 
Recovery and 
Power 
Generation 
Project in Yatai 
Group Harbin 
Cement Co., 
Ltd. 
22 Sumitomo 
Corporation 
J-TEC Co., Ltd. Xiamen Eastern 
Municipal Solid 
Waste 
Incineration 
Project 
23 Grütter Consulting Luso Carbon Fund BRT 
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 Buyer 1 Buyer 2  Project Name 
AG Zhengzhou, 
China 
24 EDF Trading Limited National Bio Energy 
Co., Ltd. 
Xinjiang Awati 
Biomass Power 
Generation 
Project 
25 Gunvor International 
B.V. Amsterdam 
Geneva Branch 
PEAR Carbon Offset 
Initiative, ltd. 
Sichuan Carbide 
Calcium 
Residues Based 
Cement Plant 
Project in 
Leshan City 
26 Climate Change 
Investment II 
S.A.SICAR 
Post 2012 Carbon 
Credit Fund C.V. 
Gansu 
Longwangtai 
Hydropower 
Project 
27 Climate Protection 
Invest AG 
Q.C.A. AG Lintan 
Qingshishan 
Hydropower 
Station 
Expansion 
Project 
28 Lakewood Carbon 
Corp. 
Solvay Energy 
Services SAS 
Methane 
Recovery 
Project of Jilin 
Province 
Xintianlong 
Alcohol Co., 
Ltd. 
29 Lakewood Carbon 
Corp. 
Solvay Energy 
Services SAS 
Methane 
Recovery 
Project of 
Meihekou City 
Fukang Alcohol 
Co., Ltd. 
30 Carbon Asset 
Management Sweden 
AB 
Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management Pte 
Ltd 
Guizhou 
Qingshuitang 
9MW Hydro 
Project 
31 Carbon Asset 
Management Sweden 
Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management Pte 
Liangshan 
Chunheweishui 
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 Buyer 1 Buyer 2  Project Name 
AB Ltd Small 
Hydropower 
Project 
32 Carbon Asset 
Management Sweden 
AB. 
Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management Pte 
Ltd. 
Qijiaping 
Hydropower 
Project in Gansu 
Province 
33 Carbon Asset 
Management Sweden 
Pte Ltd 
Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management 
Pte. Ltd 
Huadian Ningxia 
Ningdong 
Yangjiayao 
Wind Farm 
Expansion 
Project 
34 Carbon Asset 
Management Sweden 
Pte Ltd 
Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management 
Pte. Ltd 
Huadian Ningxia 
Ningdong 
10MWp Solar 
PV Power 
Station Project 
35 Carbon Asset 
Management Sweden 
Pte Ltd 
Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management 
Pte. Ltd 
Huadian Ningxia 
Ningdong 
Yangjiayao 
Phase III Wind 
Farm Project 
36 Carbon Asset 
Management Sweden 
AB 
Tricorona Carbon 
Asset Management 
Pte. Ltd. 
Musa River 1st 
Level Small 
Hydropower 
Project 
37 China Carbon N.V.* Vattenfall Energy 
Trading Netherlands 
N.V. 
Sichuan Tiejue 
25MW Hydro 
Power Project 
38 China Carbon N.V.* Vattenfall Energy 
Trading Netherlands 
N.V. 
Longyou 18 
MW 
Hydropower 
Project in 
Zhejiang 
Province 
* Corrected from “China Carbon N.V.” in the original Modalities of 
Communication. 
                                                          
 
 
 
